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In this project I argue that, as agents, we have a normative commitment to 
avoid incoherent combinations of attitudes. To this end, I defend an amended 
version of Alex Worsnip’s (2020) position on normative requirements of 
structural rationality. After offering a more uniform account of coherence 
requirements for Worsnip’s project, I argue against several problem cases 
thought to prevent the normativity of these requirements. Finally, I advocate to 
recast Worsnip’s project within a constitutivist account of agency and self-
governance. I argue that doing so provides the necessary framework to explain 




























0.1: Coherence Requirements 
Holding consistent intentions, pursuing means to ends, following our 
best judgment are all “coherent” behaviors. Our attitudes (intentions, 
judgments, beliefs, etc.) are “fitting together” in an intelligible way. The 
question, however, is this: Ought we to have coherent combinations of 
attitudes? Rather than mere “psychic tidiness,”1 are there normative 
requirements of rationality prescribing such behavior? Recently, there has been 
significant pushback against the idea that there are such normative 
requirements.2 The purpose of this dissertation is to meet this opposition and 
show that there are in fact normative coherence requirements governing the 
structure of our attitudes. Truth be told, I think that the necessary arguments 
for normative coherence requirements already exist. The problem is that these 
arguments are at best partial and scattered across various authors. Currently, I 
have yet to find anyone put the pieces together in order to defend normative 
coherence requirements sufficiently. That said, I understand my contribution to 
this topic to be modest—to bring together these necessary arguments (with a 
few amendments of my own) under one unified account.  
Broadly speaking, I aim to defend a fusion between what I see as the two 
most promising approaches so far—Alex’s Worsnip’s (2020) prohibitional 
account, advocating for the avoidance of incoherent combinations of attitudes, 
and Michael Bratman’s (2009) account, linking the normativity of coherence 
requirements to our self-governance. While primarily a defense of Worsnip’s 
position, I believe that, when assimilating Bratman’s connection to self-
governance, we find a promising account that explains why coherence 
requirements are normative for us.  
 
0.2: My Framework—Normative Reasons, Oughts, and Rationality 
In order to defend the normativity of coherence requirements properly, I 
need to lay out the framework I will be using. Doing so will include the account 
 
1 See Kolodny (2007: 241). 
 
2 See Kolodny (2005), Benjamin Kiesewetter (2017), and Brunero (2020) among others.  
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of normative reasons (hereon shortened to “reasons”)3 and oughts I am 
working with as well as my understanding of normativity. Finally, since I will 
be defending coherence requirements as rational requirements, I will say a bit 
about the kind of rationality at issue in my work.  
 
0.2a: Normative Reasons as Explanations of Oughts  
I think that reasons and oughts are a package deal. When we offer a 
reason 𝑅 to do or believe 𝜙, we are pointing to the contents of 𝑅 in order to 
explain why we ought to do or believe 𝜙.4 This relationship between oughts and 
reasons is commonly reflected in our use of language when we say things like: 
“We ought to 𝜙 because 𝑅” or “𝑅 is why we ought to 𝜙.” 
Terms like “because” and “why” link our ought-claims to our defense of 
those ought-claims. If I claim that we ought to wait to walk across the street 
until the car passes, I am defending this claim by saying (or implying) that 
walking across the road beforehand increases the likelihood that we will get 
run over (I am assuming that getting run over by a car is bad). My ought-claim 
is that we ought to wait to walk across the street until the car passes. My reason 
explaining this ought-claim is that we might get run over, and getting run over 
is bad for us.  
We can find this same relationship between normative reasons and 
oughts with moral and epistemic issues as well. We commonly hear statements 
like “𝜙-ing is the morally right (or wrong) thing to do.” In such cases, 𝜙-ing 
being morally right (or wrong) is a reason explaining why we ought (or ought 
not) to 𝜙.5 Similarly, in cases about belief, we commonly point to evidence as 
our reason 𝑅 why we ought to believe 𝜙. This relationship between oughts and 
normative reasons is commonplace. With this very broad sketch in place, I add 
the following caveats.  
 
3 The reason-dimension of my work involves normative reasons only. Therefore, unless 
otherwise stated, “reasons” are normative reasons. 
 
4 I am further relying on the idea that reasons are consideration of either facts or true 
propositions that count in favor of some response (i.e., adopting or dropping attitudes, 
performing actions, etc. This notion of “counting in favor,” I borrow from Scanlon (2000: 50). 
 
5 For those who believe moral requirements can be reduced to (or are grounded in) other 
requirements (say rational requirements for example), normative reasons to follow moral 
requirements would explain why we ought to be moral in terms of the more fundamental 
requirements.  
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When I say that we have a reason to comply with coherence 
requirements, the reasons I am referring to are “all-things-considered” or 
“definitive” reasons.6 These reasons have the last word, so-to-speak, in that they 
are not overridable. These reasons explain unconditional oughts. That said, I 
remain neutral whether reasons come in varying strengths. I am simply saying 
that, whatever strengths or scale-system exists for reasons, the reasons I am 
talking about are at the top. At the same time, I would not say that my reasons 
are “objective” in the sense that they ignore context. Let me explain.  
As I see it, reasons are sensitive to our epistemic limitations in a given 
context. In context C, we have a reason 𝑅 to 𝜙 if and only if we could be made 
aware of 𝑅’s content in C. If, unbeknownst to me, my friend next door needs 
medical attention, it seems problematic to say that I have a normative reason to 
call an ambulance (since I have no knowledge of the problem).7 Once I am made 
aware of my friend’s situation, however, it seems natural to say that I do have a 
reason to call the ambulance. In this way, we should not be understood as 
failing to respond to reasons with content of which we have no knowledge.  
 
0.2b: Coherence Requirements as Structural Rationality 
 In my work, I am committing myself to a dualist notion of rationality. 
Following Daniel Fogal and Alex Worsnip (forthcoming), there is both 
substantive rationality and structural rationality.8 Substantive rationality is the 
more common notion of the two. We are substantively rational when we 
respond correctly to the correct reasons (whatever those might be). This kind of 
rationality governs the justification of particular attitudes and actions. 
Structural rationality, on the other hand, governs the structure of our attitudes—
 
6 By “definitive” or “all-things-considered,” I follow Broome’s (2004) notion of final reasons 
rather than his pro tanto reasons.  
 
7 Perhaps we can say that “there exists” a reason, but that I do not have that reason. Either way, 
my response (or lack thereof) to this reason should not be criticizable if I am unaware of it, and 
thus unable to respond properly. See Worsnip (2019), Henning (2014), and Kiesewetter (2017) 
for further discussion on this point.  
 
8 See also Kiesewetter (2017: 45-80), Brunero (2020), and Worsnip (2020: 9-12) for similar 
versions of this distinction. As Fogal and Worsnip state the difference, “structural rationality is 
about whether one’s attitudes fit together or cohere with each other, whereas substantive 




i.e., what combinations of attitudes we ought to have or avoid.9 This kind of 
rationality does not speak to the justification of particular attitudes, only the 
structural relationship between attitudes.  
 That said, I understand coherence requirements as requirements of 
structural rationality. These requirements govern how our attitudes should and 
should not fit together—that we ought to consider coherent, and avoid incoherent, 
combinations. In doing so, these requirements (once defended) will offer a 
normative basis for criticizing rationally those of us holding incoherent 
combinations of attitudes.  
  
0.2c: Reason-Based Normativity 
By “normative” I broadly mean that a requirement has sufficient 
evaluative authority over us. This notion of normativity can be spelled out in 
two ways. First, if a requirement 𝑆 is normative, then we ought to follow 𝑆. 
Given the relation between reasons and oughts I’ve committed to (in Section 
0.2a), I also take on a reason-based conception of normativity: If 𝑆 is normative, 
then there exists a reason to follow 𝑆. Second, if 𝑆 is normative, then facts about 
what 𝑆 requires of us constitute reasons for us to have appropriately related 
responses. In this way, requirements are normative insofar as they give us 
reasons and oughts.10 Later, in Chapter Three, I will flesh out the details of the 
reason-relation(s) for normative requirements. For now, I think it best not to 
work in the fine details until we have the general view on the table. 
 
0.3: Our Roadmap 
The general structure of my dissertation follows in three chapters. In 
Chapter One, I introduce six prohibitional requirements using Worsnip’s 
definitional account of attitudinal incoherence. Following brief expositions of 
the first five requirements, I offer an alternative (stricter) conception of the 
practical enkratic requirement. In doing so, I aim to unify all six requirements 
 
9 In this dissertation I am treating structural rationality and coherence requirements 
interchangeably. Nevertheless, my intention is to remain neutral whether there are other kinds 
of structural rationality beyond coherence requirements.  
 
10 I adopt this framing of the relation between requirements and reasons from Worsnip (2020: 3-
9). 
 vii 
under a more uniform understanding of incoherence and unintelligibility (more 
to be said soon on this point).  
Next, in Chapter Two, I address several challenges brought against the 
normativity of coherence requirements and argue how the prohibitional wide-
scope account succeeds in bypassing these issues. In addition to disarming 
scope-related issues, I follow Worsnip’s position for how considerations of 
coherence function in our deliberations. Responding to Kieran Setiya’s (2007) 
and Benjamin Kiesewetter’s (2017) challenges, I offer a way forward that avoids 
relying on right kind/wrong kind reason distinctions. Finally, working from 
Worsnip’s understanding of right-kind reasons, I dispel a possible worry linked 
to classifying coherence-based reasons as reasons for actions.   
Finally, in Chapter Three, I argue that a sufficient defense of Worsnip’s 
position requires recasting his coherence requirements under a constitutivist 
framework about agency. I argue that Niko Kolodny’s “Why be rational?” 
question offers a more substantial challenge than Worsnip’s position initially 
accounts for. Nevertheless, under this new constitutivist framework, I believe 
Worsnip’s position can meet Kolodny’s challenge. In doing so, I draw a 
necessary condition between complying with coherence requirements and 
being self-governing with regard to our actions. That said, while Worsnip offers 
us a place in our deliberations for complying with coherence requirements, I 












Chapter One: Coherence Requirements 
 
1.0: Chapter Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss briefly each of the coherence 
requirements I will later11 defend as normative requirements of structural 
rationality. Following Worsnip’s work, I understand these requirements to be 
wide-scope and, “fundamentally, as prohibitions on [incoherent] combinations 
of attitudes” (2020: 16). These requirements do not tell us whether a particular 
attitude is normatively justified or not. For their rational guidance functions at 
the level of attitude combinations only.12 That said, this chapter will proceed in 
the following fashion. In Section 1.1, I introduce Worsnip’s definitional account 
of incoherence as a foundation for coherence requirements. Using this 
framework, in Section 1.2, I discuss each requirement in turn. Let us begin. 
 
1.1: Coherence Requirements as Prohibitions on Incoherent Sets of Attitudes 
Much of my understanding of coherence requirements I import from 
Worsnip’s (2018a) definitional account of attitudinal incoherence.13 Following 
Worsnip, I understand coherence requirements as prohibitions on combinations 
of conflicting attitudes—i.e., prohibitions of incoherence. Defining structural 
incoherence, Worsnip writes,  
 
A set of attitudinal mental states is jointly incoherent iff it is 
(partially) constitutive of the mental states in question that, for 
any agent that holds these attitudes, the agent is disposed, when 
conditions of full transparency are met, to give up at least one of 
the attitudes. (2018a: 188) 
 
As I understand Worsnip, we are coherent when, under conditions of full 
transparency, we are not disposed to drop any of our attitudes. Under 
conditions of “full transparency,” we hold a combination of mental states 
 
11 See Chapters Two and Three for this defense. 
 
12 Nevertheless, in collaboration with substantive reasons, these requirements do have a role to 
play in determining our attitudes (see Chapter Two, Section 2.2c). 
 
13 Hereon I shorten “attitudinal mental states” to “attitudes.” 
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without the aid of “self-deception, mental fragmentation, or any failure of self-
knowledge” pertaining to our attitudes (188). In other words, we are fully 
transparent about our attitudes when we are sufficiently “clear eyed” about 
how those attitudes relate to one another.   
This approach has intuitive appeal. At first glance, we can recognize the 
force of coherence standards quite clearly if, under conditions of full 
transparency, violating them invokes severe mental stress or dissonance. If, 
under full transparency, it is either impossible or at least very difficult to hold 
some set of attitudes together, this fact alone gives credence to the idea that this 
set is incoherent.14 In what follows, I commit to a stricter understanding of 
“disposed” than Worsnip does. From my point of view, when we are fully 
transparent about a set of incoherent attitudes we hold, we must either (1) loose 
our transparent (clear-eyed) understanding of our attitudes or (2) drop at least 
one of our attitudes. In other words, we cannot transparently hold a set of 
incoherent attitudes. This difference in my position from Worsnip’s will be 
most evident when discussing the practical enkratic requirement (Section 1.2f). 
That said, using Worsnip’s framework, let us begin going through some specific 
requirements.  
  
1.2: Six Coherence Requirements, Six Prohibitions 
Understanding coherence requirements as prohibitions on structural 
incoherence, we can capture six canonical requirements. As a brief reminder, 
these requirements are “wide-scope,” meaning that they are “stated using a 
deontic operator that takes wide-scope over a material conditional” Worsnip 
2020: 17).15 Furthermore, in order to emphasize their prohibitional nature, I 
have chosen to write out these requirements in term of what attitude 
combinations we ought to not have.16 I believe that writing these requirements 
 
14 So far, I have said nothing to defend the normative status of attitudinal coherence. The related 
cognitive strain of holding particular combinations of attitudes offers compelling evidence that 
incoherence is present, not that prohibiting such a situation involves a normative requirement.  
 
15 Said differently, we can satisfy such requirements by either adopting consequent attitudes or 
revising antecedent attitudes. However, how we ought to satisfy these requirements will be 
determined by substantive reasons (i.e., moral, prudential, epistemic, etc.). As I will discuss (in 
Chapter Two, Section 2.2b-2.2c, see also 2.1b), these requirements do not, on their own, allow 
that adopting or dropping any particular attitude is a sufficiently rational option.  
 
16 Writing out the requirements in this way is a simple application of De Morgan’s Laws 
(Chartrand et al. 2013: 112). 
 3 
this way better emphasizes their governance over attitude combinations, not 
particular attitudes. Lastly, I understand these requirements to be sensitive to an 
agent’s beliefs irrespective of the truth-status of those beliefs.17 I will now 
discuss each briefly.  
 
1.2a: The Instrumental (Means-Ends) Requirement 
 The instrumental requirement is commonly understood as follows: if we 
intend some end 𝜙, then rationality says that we ought to either (a) intend what 
we believe to be the necessary means 𝜓 for 𝜙-ing, (b) abandon the belief that 𝜓-
ing is necessary for 𝜙-ing, or (c) abandon our original intention to 𝜙. This way 
of writing the requirement showcases the options that our substantive reasons 
will weigh in on. Rather than “equally rational” options, we should instead 
understand (a)-(c) as three different ways in which this structural requirement 
may be combined with substantive requirements of evidence, morality, etc.18 
Strictly in terms of structural rationality, however, I think that a better way of 
writing this requirement illustrates what it requires of us all the time and in every 
context. That said, I write out the instrumental requirement as follows:  
 
Instrumental Requirement (𝐼𝑅): we ought to not [intend to 𝜙, and believe 
that 𝜓-ing is a necessary means for 𝜙-ing, and fail to intend to 𝜓].  
 
Written as such, we see that satisfying this requirement is really about avoiding 
a single combinational form of incoherent attitudes—where we do not intend 
the means we believe is necessary for our intended end. Even though we can 
rephrase this requirement as a disjunctive ought, we should think of 𝐼𝑅 as a 
prohibition on instrumental incoherence.19 In order to show that 𝐼𝑅 truly 
 
 
17 Once again, I am relegating the justification of particular attitudes (the truth status of beliefs, 
the correctness of judgments, the permissibility of particular intentions, etc.) to substantive 
rationality.  
 
18 I discuss this point further in Chapter Two: Sections 2.1b and 2.2c. 
 
19 Perhaps someone may object, claiming that a requirement of rationality should tell us what 
we ought to do, and understanding the instrumental requirement as such fails in this regard. 
However, I think such an objection is easily dismissible in the following way. The kind of 
rationality this requirement expresses is structural, not substantive. That is, if coherence 
requirements are about avoiding incoherent (or holding coherent) combinations of attitudes, 
then such requirements govern attitude combinations, not the justification of particular attitudes. 
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expresses incoherence (in the way defined above), however, we need to show 
why, under conditions of full transparency, we would be disposed to drop at 
least one of the attitudes in the prohibited set above. The answer is straight 
forward: because cases violating 𝐼𝑅 under conditions of full transparency 
become unintelligible. To illustrate this point, consider an example.  
Imagine I decide that, an hour from now, I will buy groceries in town. 
Also imagine I believe that, given the distance to town, driving is necessary to 
reach the grocery store in time. Now imagine that I sincerely tell you the 
following: “I intend to grocery shop in town in an hour, I believe that driving is 
necessary to reach town in time to grocery shop in an hour, but I do not intend 
to drive to town.” Something is amiss here. For, as Worsnip points out, in such 
a case I “would be confused about what it is to have an intention” (191). I think 
Worsnip is correct.  
 This conclusion stems from the common understanding that intentions 
are distinct from attitudes like wishes and desires (191). When I say that “I 
intend to 𝜙,” I have done more than simply express what I am motivated to do. 
I am expressing my decision to 𝜙. Attitudes such as desires and wishes function 
in our decisions only antecedently, as possible motivations. Intentions, on the 
other hand, should be understood as guiding attitudes20 that “tell the story” of 
what we choose and aim to do.  
That said, it is unintelligible to talk of having an intention to 𝜙 while not 
intending to do what I believe must be done in order to 𝜙. For, regardless of what 
independently constitutes 𝜙-ing, my beliefs about how to 𝜙 set a conceptual 
standard I hold myself to when I decide to 𝜙. If, by my own beliefs, grocery 
shopping in town in an hour requires driving to town (to get there in time), I 
cannot intelligibly claim that I am intending to grocery shop in town in an hour 
unless I intend to drive there. For doing otherwise violates the very conditions 
 
That said, it is reasonable to stipulate that such requirements are not meant to tell us which 
attitudes to adopt or drop. This latter process (deciding what we should do in a given context) 
should be relegated to substantive rationality in the sense of responding correctly to substantive 
normative reasons (pertaining to issues of epistemic evidence, morality, prudence, etc.). What a 
requirement of structural rationality should prescribe is that, whatever path our substantive 
reasons lead us down, this path ought not to be a structurally irrational one. More to be said on 
this point in Chapter Two, Section 2.1.  
 
20 By “guiding” I am following Bratman (1987, 2009) and others who hold that intentions are 
constitutive parts of partial plans aimed toward the successful completion of ends. 
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that I believe are necessary for grocery shopping in town in an hour. And in 
doing so, I would effectively be claiming that I intend to do what I believe is 
impossible to do. Such a claim (as well as the corresponding combination of 
attitudes) will always be unintelligibly irrational.  
Given the above, we can see how violating 𝐼𝑅 leads to an unintelligible 
illustration of what we choose and aim to do. When we do not follow 𝐼𝑅, we 
lose a clear sense of what we are intending to do. Now, this is not to say that 
instrumental irrationality is unintelligible full-stop. Rather, instrumental 
irrationality is unintelligible under conditions of full transparency (2018a: 190-191). 
It is a common story that we intend to do something, but then get distracted or 
somehow end up not intending the necessary means for that something. 
Perhaps our attitudes are fragmented21 such that we hold the combination of 
attitudes 𝐼𝑅 prohibits but do not “connect the dots” so-to-speak between our 
attitudes. But when we are forced to consider such a combination under 
conditions of full transparency (as the above example does) the picture becomes 
unintelligible. And this unintelligibility is what grounds our disposition either 
to lose our “clear-eyed” perspective on our attitudes or to change one of the 
attitudes. Thus, the instrumental requirement is incoherent in the relevant 
sense. This requirement fits the disposition account of incoherence above and 
functions as a prohibition on instrumental incoherence in all cases.  
 
1.2b: The Intention Consistency Requirement 
A similar, albeit far simpler, story can be told about why we ought not to 
hold intentions that we believe are not copossible. This requirement is 
commonly known as the intention consistency requirement.22 Once again I 
formulate this requirement in terms of what we ought to not do: 
 
Intention Consistency Requirement (𝐼𝐶𝑅): we ought to not [hold intentions 
𝑖!, 𝑖", …, 𝑖# and believe that 𝑖!, 𝑖", …, 𝑖# are not copossibly achievable]. 
 
 
21 See Stalnaker (1984) and Egan (2008) for discussions of mental fragmentation.  
 
22 Among others, Bratman (2009: 413) discusses this requirement.  
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Similar to the instrumental requirement, 𝐼𝐶𝑅 instructs us that we ought to avoid 
attitude combinations that, under conditions of full transparency, become 
unintelligible to us. In the case of	𝐼𝐶𝑅, the attitudes in question are two or more 
intentions and the instrumental belief that these intentions are not copossibly 
achievable. 
 Consider once again the grocery shopping example. However, this time 
imagine that, in addition to holding the intention to grocery shop in town in an 
hour I also hold the intention not to drive to town today. Since, from the 
original example I believe that driving to town is necessary for grocery 
shopping in an hour, I also believe that the two intentions I now hold are not 
copossibly achievable. If I succeed in grocery shopping in town in an hour 
(from my set of beliefs), this result will obtain only because I drove to town in 
time. But if so, then I (intentionally) fail to succeed in my intention to not drive 
to town today. Vice versa, succeeding in not driving to town today ensures 
(from the vantage point of my beliefs) that I (intentionally) will not succeed in 
my intention to grocery shop in town in an hour.  
 Thus, in either case, effectively I am intending to do something I believe 
is impossible to do. Since, for at least one of my intentions, I believe that I am 
intentionally making it impossible to pursue what I aim to do. In such a case, I 
am still violating the instrumental requirement (since I do not intend to drive to 
town), but I am also violating	𝐼𝐶𝑅. Now, from our prior discussion of the 
instrumental requirement, we saw how, under conditions of full transparency, 
intending to do something we do not intend to succeed at doing is 
unintelligible. The same unintelligibility (under conditions of full transparency) 
holds when violating	𝐼𝐶𝑅—for in both cases we are intending to do what we 
believe is impossible to do. In either case, when we are “clear eyed” so-to-speak 
about our attitudes, this combination becomes unintelligible.  
 That said, 𝐼𝐶𝑅 holds under Worsnip’s definition of incoherence. Since, 
when considered under conditions of full transparency, this combination of 
attitudes become unintelligible to us. We can follow Worsnip in saying that, in 
the light of day, any claim to hold this incoherent combination of intentions and 
instrumental beliefs misunderstands what it means to hold an intention in the 
first place. Moving forward.  
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1.2c: The Modus Ponens Requirement 
Now let us talk about modus ponens. We commonly accept that if 𝑝, and 
𝑝 → 𝑞, then 𝑞. As a coherence requirement, modus ponens is commonly and 
prescriptively applied to cases of belief formation. If we believe truly that the 
earth is round, and we believe round things cannot be flat, then we ought to 
believe the earth is not flat. This sounds reasonable. However, before going 
further, a clarification is needed.  
In the current context, the prescriptions of a modus ponens requirement 
should function over combinations of beliefs (and belief entailments),23 not 
particular beliefs. As discussed briefly in the beginning of this chapter, the kind 
of rationality I am seeking to express with coherence requirements is structural, 
not substantive. Such requirements do not prescribe the adoption or avoidance 
of particular attitudes, but instead prescribe at the level of combinations of 
attitudes. Thus, if modus ponens is to be understood as a coherence 
requirement under this account, it must function within this same framework. 
That said, we should not think of the modus ponens requirement in this context 
as telling us what particular beliefs we rationally ought to (or ought not to) have 
given our other beliefs. Rather, modus ponens should be understood here as 
telling us what combinations of beliefs we rationally ought to have (or ought to 
avoid). 
Finally, as done with the other requirements discussed, I will lay out a 
modus ponens requirement in a prohibitional fashion. This requirement will 
prescribe what combinations of beliefs we rationally ought to avoid. That said, I 
propose the following: 
 
Modus Ponens Requirement (𝑀𝑃𝑅): we ought to not [believe 𝑝, and believe 
𝑝 → 𝑞, and not believe 𝑞]. 
 
Here, there is no prescription of particular attitudes. For the prohibition 
functions at the level of belief combinations. Specifically, 𝑀𝑃𝑅 is telling us that 
we ought not to have combinations of attitudes where our absence of a belief is 
 
23 Hereon belief entailments are implicitly included when talking about one’s beliefs.  
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not consistent with the entailments of our other beliefs.24 To illustrate what 𝑀𝑃𝑅 
prohibits, consider a more perplexing version of the earth example. 
 Imagine I have the following combination of attitudes {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}. I (𝑎) 
believe the earth is round, (𝑏) believe that round things cannot be flat, but (𝑐) do 
not belief that the earth is not flat.25 At this point, regardless of other concerns 
about what particular beliefs I should or should not have, it should be quite 
clear that there is a structural problem.26 My beliefs 𝑎 and 𝑏 (from my 
perspective) entail that the earth is not flat. Nevertheless, I lack this entailed 
belief. More to the point, (𝑐) my lack of believing that the earth is not flat is 
inconsistent with the entailments of my beliefs (𝑎 and 𝑏). So, {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} is jointly 
incoherent. 
 Further to the point, cases like {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} are jointly incoherent in the sense 
we are aiming at because, under conditions of full transparency, holding such 
attitude combinations become unintelligible. In cases like {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}, there is no 
understanding for why, given 𝑎 and 𝑏, I hold 𝑐 instead of the belief that the 
earth is not flat. We can only intelligibly describe such a situation by saying 
things like “I have not connected the dots somehow” or “I have not put the 
pieces together to see the problem.” Statements like these imply cases like {𝑎, 𝑏, 
𝑐} “make sense” only when full transparency is not present, when I am 
fragmented somehow. But if I were clearly to state {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}, or if I “did connect 
the dots” so-to-speak, it becomes unintelligible how I would hold such a 
combination of attitudes. In this way, like with intention cases in the prior 
section, clear-eyed inconsistency is always incoherently unintelligible.  
 
24 By prohibiting incoherent belief combinations, 𝑀𝑃𝑅 lends to the common view that 
incoherent belief combinations signal the presence of false beliefs. 
 
25 Here I am understanding a lack of belief as an attitudinal mental state. 
 
26 As Fogal and Worsnip (forthcoming) point out, the rational failure of holding unjustified 
attitudes is distinctly different from the rational failure of holding incoherent belief 
combinations: “Consider someone – let’s call him Tom – who believes that he is Superman, and 
believes that Superman can fly. In believing that he’s Superman, Tom has a belief that flies in 
the face of his evidence (or so we may safely stipulate). Moreover, it’s very natural to describe 
this belief as irrational. But now let us add another piece of information about Tom: he believes 
he can’t fly. (Suppose he’s tried several times, without success.) Intuitively, given this further 
piece of information, we can now see that Tom is irrational in a second respect: specifically, he 
fails to believe an obvious consequence of his other beliefs” (forthcoming: 6-7). 
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 That said, 𝑀𝑃𝑅’s naturally fits within the larger conception of coherence 
requirements. For its prohibition of such attitude combinations is exactly a 
prohibition of the kind of incoherence I am working with under Worsnip’s 
definition. With 𝑀𝑃𝑅 now in place, it is time to move to the next requirement. 
 
1.2d: The Transitive Preference Requirement 
The next requirement I wish to discuss is what is known as the transitive 
preference requirement. Simply put, this requirement is usually understood to 
claim that preference reasoning ought to function transitively. If I prefer 𝑎 to 𝑏, 
and I prefer 𝑏 to 𝑐, then I ought to prefer 𝑎 to 𝑐. In keeping with the current 
framework, however, I propose the following: that preference reasoning ought 
not to be intransitive. Spelled out, we get the following: 
 
Transitive Preference Requirement (𝑇𝑃𝑅): we ought to not [prefer 𝑎 over 𝑏, 
and prefer 𝑏 over 𝑐, and prefer 𝑐 over 𝑎]. 
 
As we can see, the combination type of preferences 𝑇𝑃𝑅 prohibits is cyclical (or 
intransitive). But are attitude combinations involving cyclical preferences 
incoherent? Yes, I believe they are. To illustrate why, first consider the 
following example. 
I am trying to decide what I will do today. Before me are three options: 
(𝑎) working on my dissertation, (𝑏) mowing the lawn, and (𝑐) watching the final 
season of Dark on Netflix.27 When considering the pairwise comparisons one at 
a time, it is easy to imagine the following circular reasoning. Because my 
dissertation is necessary for both my academic and professional advancement, I 
prefer working on my dissertation to maintaining the lawn. Between mowing 
the lawn and watching television, however, television seems rather frivolous 
while maintaining the lawn attends positively to health concerns (limiting the 
presence of ticks and other disease carrying insects living in tall grass). So, I 
prefer mowing the lawn to watching the final season of Dark. Now, between 
working on my dissertation and watching the final season of Dark, I think that 
 
27 The spirit of this example I borrow from Worsnip (2018a: 191-192). 
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watching television is far less work than philosophy, and my deadline is still far 
off. So, I end up preferring watching Dark to working on my dissertation today. 
While seemingly commonplace, this example shows intransitive preference 
reasoning: (𝑎) over (𝑏), (𝑏) over (𝑐), and (𝑐) over (𝑎).  
 The problem is that reasoning of this kind fails to establish clearly any 
conclusion over what to do. For while there is a clear sense of preference 
between any two options, the above pairwise preferencing fails to show my 
preference between all the options. In Bratman’s terms, I lack any clear 
standpoint on what I prefer to do today (2009: 430-431). However, reaching a 
conclusive decision on what I prefer to do is exactly the aim of preference 
reasoning. Thus, intransitive preferential reasoning is a failure to reason 
preferentially at all. Such reasoning is reasoning without a conclusion. 
 Furthermore, intransitive preferential reasoning becomes unintelligible 
under conditions of full transparency. As Worsnip’s points out, the crucial 
insight behind the intelligibility of the example above is that we think about 
“the pairwise comparisons one at a time” (Worsnip 2018a: 192).28 As long as I 
do not “connect the dots” between my preference pairs, the incoherence in play 
is sustainable. However, when I consider these preference pairs all together 
(now in a fully transparency sense), my intransitive preferencing becomes 
unintelligible. If, in the context of deciding what to do, I say, “I prefer 
dissertation work to lawn mowing, prefer lawn mowing to watching television, 
but prefer watching television to dissertation work,” this seems nonsensical. In 
Worsnip’s words, “this sounds like a joke” (192). Once again, we have a clear 
sense in which, under conditions of full transparency, the above combination of 
attitudes (in this case preferences) is unintelligible—and so fit Worsnip’s 
definitional account of incoherence. That said, 𝑇𝑃𝑅 prohibits incoherent 





28 The difference between pairwise considerations and considerations covering the entire set of 
options offers a useful illustration about conditions of full transparency: The former pairwise 
preferences lack full transparency because there is no “connecting the dots” between these 
preference pairs whereas the latter consideration of the entire set brings the preference pairs 
into conjunction with one another.  
 11 
1.2e: The Doxastic Enkratic Requirement 
Now consider the doxastic enkratic requirement. Commonly 
understood, enkratic failure (or akrasia) occurs when we act or believe against 
our own best judgment.29 In terms of evidence and belief, then, the doxastic 
enkratic requirement prescribes that we ought to believe what our evidence-
based judgments support. The attitudes in question, then, are our beliefs and 
evidence-based judgments about those beliefs.  
 As a prohibition of doxastic incoherence, then, I understand this enkratic 
requirement as follows:  
 
Doxastic Enkratic Requirement (𝐷𝐸𝑅): we ought to not [judge that we lack 
sufficient evidence for believing 𝑝 and believe 𝑝].30 
 
The idea here is simple. Evidence aside, if I judge that I lack sufficient evidence 
for believing the earth is flat, then by my own standard of judgment I ought not to 
believe the earth is flat. Thus, the question is whether we can intelligibly hold 
combinations of attitudes that violate 𝐷𝐸𝑅. Without full transparency about 
these attitudes, I believe we can hold such combinations. However, once we 
sufficiently examine our attitudes (consider them together under conditions of 
full transparency), holding such combinations of attitudes becomes 
unintelligible.  
Imagine that, contrary to my judgment about the evidence, my everyday 
experience of walking and driving instill in me the non-occurrent belief that the 
earth is flat. In this case, while I judge that I lack sufficient evidence to believe 
the earth is flat,31 I still feel that my everyday experience is telling and so, deep 
 
29 Some believe that akrasia does not exist (See Richard M. Hare [1952] for example). If this is 
the case, that akrasia does not exist, then our work is done for us. We need not be concerned 
about structurally rational requirements prohibiting akrasia. However, where there remains 
serious debate on this issue, I work under the assumption that akrasia is possible (just in case). 
 
30 The alternative case, where we judge that we have sufficient evidence to believe 𝑝 yet we do 
not believe 𝑝, is covered by the modus ponens requirement: We ought not to [believe 𝑎, and 
believe 𝑎 → 𝑏, and not believe 𝑏]. In this case, 𝑎 is our recognition of the evidence pertaining to 
𝑝, 𝑎 → 𝑏 is our judgment that the evidence pertaining to 𝑝 is sufficient for believing 𝑝, and 𝑏 is 
𝑝. 
 
31 Say because I’ve seen pictures of the earth from the moon and the ISS, studied the 
mathematics concerning sunlight displacement over spheres, and generally believe the 
available scientific data.   
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down, I still believe the earth is flat. While undoubtedly odd, this case 
unfortunately doesn’t seem that farfetched for some. First, because there are 
people that believe the earth is flat. And second, because even today we still 
incorporate nomenclature that seems to contradict widely accepted scientific 
realities (why “sunrise” and not “earthrise”?). Regardless of our feelings about 
my mental state in this example, at least the situation seems intelligible as long 
as I keep from “connecting the dots.” However, the example’s intelligibility 
quickly disappears under conditions of full transparency—for holding this 
same combination of attitudes now leads to an explicit contradiction. 
If, under conditions of full transparency, I both believe the earth is flat 
and judge that I lack sufficient evidence for this belief, I am effectively holding 
contradicting judgments about the available evidence. Under conditions of full 
transparency, we hold beliefs we think are justified, and these justifications are 
our judgments about the evidence supporting those beliefs.32 Thus, under 
conditions of full transparency, maintaining the belief that the earth is flat 
entails that I think this belief is justified—which is just to say that I judge that I 
have sufficient evidence for believing the earth is flat. But now I have a 
problem. For my position is now that I judge both that I do and do not have 
sufficient evidence to believe the earth is flat. So, I explicitly hold contradicting 
judgments, which is unintelligible.  
That said, if doxastic akrasia is possible, it seems possible only outside 
conditions of full transparency. For when we explicitly “connect the dots” 
between a belief we hold and our judgment that this belief is unjustified, 
something’s got to give. This unintelligibility of doxastic akrasia in explicit 
cases (with full transparency over the one’s attitudes) shows how such 
violations of 𝐷𝐸𝑅 are incoherent in Worsnip’s (2018a) sense. Now, let us move 
on to the last coherence requirement.  
 
1.2f: The Practical Enkratic Requirement 
 Lastly, let us briefly talk about the pragmatic enkratic requirement. Like 
with its doxastic counterpart, we violate the practical enkratic requirement 
 
32 As Worsnip puts the point, “our beliefs, when they are formed reflectively in ways that are 
transparent to us, are controlled by our judgments about the evidence” (2018a: 194). 
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when we go against our best judgment. In the practical case, however, the 
general idea is that our intentions ought to fall in line with our best judgment of 
what we ought to do.  
 Following my framework, then, I propose we understand the practical 
enkratic requirement as a prohibition on attitude combinations where our 
intentions contradict our judgments about those intentions. That said, the 
requirement is as follows:  
 
Practical Enkratic Requirement (𝑃𝐸𝑅): we ought to not [judge that we 
ought to 𝜙 and not intend to 𝜙].33 
 
We violate 𝑃𝐸𝑅 (are practically akratic) when we fail to intend what we judge 
we ought to do. Simple enough as a rule, it seems. However, there remains an 
open question whether we can classify practical akrasia alongside other 
instances of incoherence. I think we can. However, to do so, I must part ways 
with Worsnip’s (2018a) assessment of practical akrasia. Nevertheless, I believe 
my approach here better assimilates practical akrasia into Worsnip’s (2018a) 
definitional account of incoherence. The initial problem is this.  
 It is generally held that when we are practically akratic, when we violate 
𝑃𝐸𝑅, we are “clear eyed” about our incoherent set of attitudes. If this is true, 
then it seems that violating 𝑃𝐸𝑅 can be done under conditions of full 
transparency. If so, then it seems we have a conceptual problem with our 
account of incoherence. For instances of incoherence under conditions of full 
transparency are supposed to be unintelligible. That said, if we can be reflective 
and clear-eyed when we violate 𝑃𝐸𝑅, such cases do not seem unintelligible at 
all.  
 Worsnip’s answer to this problem is to claim that practical akrasia is a 
relatively weak form of incoherence. As Worsnip writes, we “should allow that 
incoherence is something that comes in degrees” (2018a: 199) and that in “less 
incoherent cases, such as akrasia, the disposition is weak enough” that we can 
 
33 For alternative cases where we judge we ought not to 𝜓 and we fail to intend not to do it, 
substitute ¬𝜓 for 𝜙. This substitution will also cover stronger cases where we intend to do 
something we judge we ought not to do since intending to 𝜓 entails not intending to ¬𝜓.  
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transparently sustain this incoherent set of attitudes. While this concession 
about practical akrasia does not itself make Worsnip’s account of incoherence 
untenable, it does throw a wrench into the mix so-to-speak. Here is why. 
 In all other cases of incoherence, Worsnip’s defense of his dispositional 
definition was that, when under conditions of full transparency, these cases 
became unintelligible. This is a compelling argument because, when viewed 
under conditions of full transparency, if the cases are unintelligible, we cannot 
reasonably think that such occurrent attitude combinations can be held in the 
mind. However, by saying that practically akratic attitude combinations can be 
transparently held together, we are saying that Worsnip’s argument for prior 
cases of incoherence cannot apply here (or at least not in a general way). For we 
are saying that practically akratic people who are fully transparent about their 
attitudes can be intelligible. 
That said, practical akrasia’s incoherent status becomes less than 
obvious, and if this state really is incoherent, this claim begins to seem ad hoc. 
For it seems that we are left without a strong argument for why practical 
akrasia is incoherent. 34 That said, we either allow that practical akrasia is unlike 
other incoherent states, or we say that “somehow” practical akrasia is “just 
weakly incoherent enough” that it can be transparently sustained. The first 
option begs the question whether practical akrasia really is an incoherent state, 
and the second option seems very ad hoc in the current framework because it 
no longer seems that there is much argument for how practical akrasia fits the 
dispositional account. 
 Now, perhaps I’m being ungenerous to Worsnip’s analysis of practical 
akrasia. However, I think there’s a better option to take—an option that allows 
for cases of what we think is clear-eyed practical akrasia while also showing that 
such cases are in fact unintelligible. This option, I think is promising and, if 
adopted, adds weight to Worsnip’s overall dispositional account.  
 
34 Of course, we can still say that, with practical akrasia, the disposition remains (albeit weakly) 
to drop at least one of the attitudes in question, and in this way these cases do fit the 
dispositional account. However, we can have dispositions to drop attitudes for other reasons 
than the attitude combination being incoherent (we decide to change our minds or any number 
of substantive reasons). Without showing the unintelligibility of a fully transparent practically 
akratic person, we lose a strong argument as to why practical akrasia is incoherent. Concerns 
like this are why I believe that John Brunero comments that Worsnip’s “theory has difficulty 
allowing for the irrationality of clear-eyed akrasia” (Brunero 2020: 207, fn. 51). 
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As a preliminary note, we should first understand that, in cases of 
practical akrasia, the judgment involved must be an all-things-considered 
judgment. By “all-things-considered” I mean that, given some situation or 
context 𝐶, I weigh all my various reasons, concerns, etc. and judge that, all-
things-considered, I ought to 𝜙. This point is important because, without an all-
things-considered judgment present, my lack of intention following a judgment 
to 𝜙 is not necessarily incoherent.35 Without an all-things-considered judgment, 
the fact that we lack the corresponding intention to some judgment can simply 
be explained by further reasoning, leading to a different decision (ultimately 
our all-things-considered judgment).36 
That said, if being practically akratic requires that we fail to intend what 
we all-things-considered judge we ought to do, then we end up with a 
contradiction of beliefs about our reason(s) corresponding to this judgment. This 
contradiction arises because an all-things-considered judgment to 𝜙 entails the 
belief that we have an all-things-considered normative reason 𝑅 to 𝜙.37 
However, if our lack of intention to 𝜙 really is something we choose to do (an 
attitude we have self-knowledge about), then this fact entails that we believe we 
 
35 Consider this: Based on my commitments as a graduate student, I ought to work on my 
dissertation. Now say I have a sick family member needing care. Most would say that I ought to 
take care of this person. The point here is simply that I have various reasons and judgments 
about what I ought to do based on different parameters, standards, and commitments. The fact 
that I intend to take care of my family instead of working on my dissertation tonight does not 
make me practically akratic. For in this case I must have further judged that taking care of 
family outweighed being a diligent student tonight. Furthermore, whatever I do intend can be 
linked to my final all-things-considered judgment. Hence, I can always be understood as 
practically enkratic. This same kind of explanation can be made about failing to do the 
seemingly “right thing.” While in this case I may be morally criticizable, it is not clear that I am 
rationally criticizable. Rather than intend to do what I judge to be the “right thing” (based on 
some standard), I may also judge (based on a standard of self-interest) that doing the “right 
thing” is too burdensome for me or disallows me the satisfaction of my desires, etc. Granted, 
this case may show me to be morally bankrupt, but it does not necessarily show me to be 
incoherent. It merely shows that I judged to do something else based on a different standard 
from my first judgment (and I further judged that my second judgment outweighed the first). 
 
36 What happens if we simply ignore our judgment (one that is not all-things-considered)? 
Would this case be practically akratic? Not necessarily. If I judge (not all-things-considered) that 
I ought to 𝜙, but fail to intend to 𝜙 there is still the question of why I failed to intend to 𝜙. If a 
reason and/or judgment can be cited, then this fact undermines the idea that I am being 
practically akratic. For it seems that I simply weighed my judgment with an alternative one. 
However, if no reason or judgment can be cited, then it seems that my failing to intend to 𝜙 is 
not something I have done (or failed to do) at all. In either case we fail to arrive at practical 
akrasia. 
 
37 𝑅 could also represent a collection of normative reasons we believe collectively outweigh the 
alternatives. The present argument follows regardless of this fact.  
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have another normative reason 𝑅$ either weighing against 𝜙-ing or weighing in 
favor of some alternative to 𝜙-ing. The crucial point is this: the fact that we are 
swayed by 𝑅$ over 𝑅 shows that we believe 𝑅$ overrides 𝑅.38 However, if we 
believe that 𝑅$ overrides 𝑅, then we do not believe that 𝑅 is an all-things-
considered normative reason to 𝜙. Now we have a contradiction. For now, it is 
the case that we believe both that 𝑅 is and is not an all-things-considered 
normative reason to 𝜙. 
As it stands, then, holding this contradiction of beliefs under conditions 
of full transparency is simply unintelligible. It would be intelligible if we did 
not “connect the dots” about why we fail to intend to 𝜙. If, instead of 𝜙-ing, I 
end up watching television all night (but do not know why I do this), we could 
say that I am being practically akratic. However, in this case, since I fail to have 
self-knowledge about my attitudes,39 I am not under conditions of full 
transparency about those attitudes. If, however, I am under conditions of full 
transparency, then I am fully aware that I believe both that 𝑅 is and is not an 
all-things-considered (non-overridable) reason to 𝜙. Holding such a 
contradiction of occurrent beliefs is just as unintelligible as holding occurrent 
intentions believed to be non-copossible.  
As I have argued, clear-eyed practical akrasia is just as incoherent as the 
other forms of incoherence we have been discussing. However, now I am faced 
with a dilemma. If the above argument holds water, how do I explain why 
cases of practical akrasia seem clear-eyed?  
 
Practical Akrasia and Trading on Perspective 
I think an answer is this: in examples of what seems like clear-eyed 
akrasia, we unknowingly trade across different standards between our all-
things-considered judgment and what we choose to do. Consider an example of 
 
38 If we did not believe that 𝑅! overrides 𝑅, then we would lose any sense of why we followed 𝑅! 
rather than 𝑅, which means we fail to have full self-knowledge about our lack of intention to 𝜙. 
But if this is the case, we are no longer under conditions of full transparency (Worsnip 2018a: 
188). Thus, believing that 𝑅! overrides 𝑅 is necessary to stay within the full transparency 
requirement of the example.  
 
39 For example, I lack self-knowledge both about why I failed to intend to 𝜙 and why I instead 
intended to watch television.  
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practical akrasia by Bratman. In this example, a depressed Sam drinks and has 
the following conversation:  
 
Drinking: ‘Look here. Your reasons for abstaining seem clearly 
stronger than your reasons for drinking. So how can you have 
thought that it would be best to drink?” To which Sam replies: “I 
don’t think it would be best to drink. Do you think I’m stupid 
enough to think that, given how strong my reasons for abstaining 
are? I think it would be best to abstain. Still, I’m drinking.’ (1979: 
156) 
 
At first look, this example seems to illustrate exactly the kind of clear-eyed 
akrasia we have come to know. That said, I will now argue for an alternative 
interpretation—that Sam is not clear-eyed about his attitudes because he lacks 
full self-knowledge about the entailments of his judgment against drinking. In 
doing so, I argue that Sam violates Worsnip’s conditions of full transparency. 
Okay, how is this possible?  
I think the story goes like this: Sam unknowingly trades between two 
different standards—one leading to his judgment against drinking, the other 
leading to his decision to drink. If so, then what allows Sam to act intentionally 
against his all-thing-considered judgment is that, due to his depression, he 
irrationally fails to occupy the neutral perspective wherein his reasons for drinking 
can be overridden by his reasons against drinking. Sam’s depression, in effect, 
separates Sam’s inconsistent beliefs: 
 
1. That he has an all-things-considered reason 𝑅 against drinking, and 
2. That he has a reason 𝑅$ that overrides 𝑅.  
 
When Sam is asked about his reasons against drinking, he recalls that, all-
things-considered, he ought not to drink. Nevertheless, referring back to his 
drinking, Sam unknowingly shifts perspective back to his depression wherein 
his reasons for drinking, now isolated away from his reasons against drinking, have 
no opposition. In this way, Sam holds both inconsistent beliefs above (albeit 
isolated away from one another). What is irrational about Sam, then, is not that 
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he has no reasons for drinking; rather, it is that he fails (due to his depression) to 
make the connection that his all-things-considered judgment against drinking 
entails that 𝑅$ cannot override 𝑅.  
That said, I now offer two reasons for this interpretation.40 First, if my 
earlier argument against clear-eyed akrasia holds water, then understanding 
Sam to be “clear-eyed” about his attitudes requires taking the position that 
holding occurrent inconsistent beliefs about our reasons is intelligible. But this 
just seems false because it makes no rational sense to believe that 𝑝 ∧ ¬𝑝 is true.  
Second, we already have a precedent for unknowingly trading between 
different standards when we are not clear-eyed about our attitudes. Recall my 
discussion of the transitive preference requirement (section 1.2d). In my 
Worsnip-inspired example, I was trying to decide between three options: (𝑎) 
working on my dissertation, (𝑏) mowing the lawn, and (𝑐) watching the final 
season of Dark on Netflix. In doing so I reasoned in a circle: I preferred  
 
1. Dissertation work over lawn mowing (because of academic and 
professional considerations), 
2. Lawn mowing over watching season three of Dark (because of health 
concerns about ticks), and 
3. Watching season three of Dark over dissertation work (because I am lazy 
and watching television is less work than philosophy).  
 
The purpose of preference reasoning, however, is to arrive at a decision about 
what I prefer to do. That said, my reasoning is intelligible only because I do not 
consider all three options together. As long as, unbeknownst to me, I keep the 
preference pairs separated, I fail to notice that I am reasoning by different standards 
with different pairs. In order to make a decision about my three options, 
however, I need to consider all three under the same standard. This unity of 
perspective across all options is what facilitates the linearity of preference 
reasoning.  
 
40 I do want to reiterate that I am interpreting Sam as choosing to drink. He is not overwhelmed 
by his desires, nor is he being forced in any way. I understand Sam’s drinking as an intentional 
action. For if Sam is not intentionally drinking, he already lacks self-knowledge about (the 
reason) why he is drinking—violating Worsnip’s conditions of full transparency.  
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The same holds true for the case about Sam’s akratic drinking. From 
Sam’s current perspective, his drinking alleviates his depression and so, from 
this perspective, drinking is prima facie the best thing to do (Bratman 179: 168). 
When Sam is challenged on this point, he swaps back to his “neutral” 
perspective whereby some neutral standard41 he once again agrees that not 
drinking is all-things-considered best. However, directly following this claim, 
Sam once again falls back into his depression-oriented perspective wherein he 
chooses to drink based solely on the reasons in favor of doing so.  
In this way, we can understand Sam’s behavior as both irrational and 
intentional. For as Bratman puts the point, “Sam's irrationality in the original 
case does not preclude it from being a case of reasoning but is, rather, a feature 
of that reasoning” (169-170). My claim, then, is that this irrational “feature” of 
Sam’s reasoning derives from his unconscious swapping back and forth 
between perspectives and standards of judgment.42 As Sergio Tenenbaum 
similarly remarks, it is possible to recall something we have judged to be true 
while also failing to recall the normative force behind this judgment (2007: 
270).43 
The above interpretation of Sam allows us to understand practical 
akrasia as being unintelligible under conditions of full transparency. For Sam 
fails to have full self-knowledge of his attitudes because he fails to recognize the 
entailments of these attitudes. Sam fails to realize that his all-things-considered 
judgment against drinking, together with his intentional act of drinking, entails 
that he believes that he has a reason against drinking that is both overridable 
and not. 
 
41 A question remains as to how to account for this neutral perspective where we make all-
things-considered judgments. See Derek Baker (2018) for a discussion of this problem as well as 
skepticism for its solution. Nevertheless, I leave this issue open. I believe that having some way 
of arriving at all-things-considered reasons and oughts is a precondition for the discussion of 
practical akrasia. 
 
42 Bratman seems to point to the disconnection itself in Sam’s reasoning (his lack of explanation) 
as to why he chooses reasons to drink over stronger reasons against doing so (1979: 167-170). I 
go just one step further and say that Sam’s disconnection derives from his unconscious 
swapping back and forth between standards of judgment. For Bratman and I agree that it is 
possible to “explain why Sam reasons in this admittedly irrational way by, for example, 
appealing to the depth of his depression, the strength of his desire to get out of it, and, perhaps, 
to the way in which his depression dulled his appreciation of his reasons for abstaining” (170). 
 
43 Tenenbaum goes on to say that, in cases of practical akrasia, we can look to our emotions and 
desires as the interfering mechanisms that can place us in a “perspective whose inadequacy 
[we][…] only vaguely understand[…] right now” (277). 
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This is good news, I think. For if the above analysis is correct, then 
practical akrasia falls comfortably within Worsnip’s (2018a) dispositional 
account alongside the other forms of attitudinal incoherence. At the same time, 
this interpretation also allows us to treat practical akrasia as a special case of 
incoherence. For in all other cases, Worsnip’s position on incoherence functions 
on the idea that any  
 
apparent intention, belief, or other attitude that, given the agent’s 
other mental states, will put her in sustained, transparent 
violation of a coherence requirement does not really count as an 
instance of that attitude: it is not intention or belief proper, but 
something less—for example, instead of an intention, a wish or 
desire; instead of a belief, a pretense or a supposition. (2018a: 194). 
 
However, with cases of practical akrasia we can still say that Sam has a genuine 
all-things-considered judgment against drinking and a genuine intention to 
drink (since both these attitudes are determined from separate perspectives).44 
With Sam, the case is simply that he fails to have full self-knowledge of the fact 
that having these attitudes entails inconsistent beliefs about the status of his 
reasons against drinking. That said, I believe this interpretation can 
accommodate Worsnip’s moderate position between more hardline accounts 
that either deny the existence of practical akrasia or deny its incoherent status.45 
 
1.3: Chapter Conclusion 
 Working within Worsnip’s dispositional account of incoherence, I have 
spelled out six wide-scope coherence requirements. Each of these requirements 
prohibit the holding of specific incoherent attitude combinations. Departing 
 
44 Of course, Sam’s intention is arrived at within an emotionally compromised perspective, but 
nonetheless, his reasons for intending to drink are genuine. So, the problem is not that the 
intention is not genuine, but rather that the intention may be ultimately unjustified due to the 
normative status of the reasons that instantiate it.  
 
45 For the former, see Hare (1952: 19–20, 164–170). For the latter, see Arpaly (2000). It should be 
noted that my position treats practical akrasia as something that happens when we are not 
clear-eyed (not under conditions of full transparency) about our attitudes. If others define 
practical akrasia as clear-eyed akrasia, then I deny this phenomenon for the reasons I have given. 
In this case, I will speak of practical akrasia* rather than the clear-eyed conception.  
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from Worsnip, I have argued that, under conditions of full transparency, cases 
of practical akrasia are just as unintelligible as the other forms of incoherence 
discussed. If correct, I believe my treatment of practical akrasia offers a more 
unified account of incoherence for Worsnip’s project.  
 With this account of coherence requirements on the table, I now move 
forward in defending their normative status. In Chapter Two, I address several 
arguments made against the normativity of coherence requirements. Here, I 
also make my case for adopting a wide-scope conception of these requirements. 
Finally, in Chapter Three, I will address a final challenge—that of the source of 
normativity for coherence requirements. In doing so, I make a constitutivist 
case for the normativity of coherence requirements. As a consequence of my 
view, intentional attitudinal incoherence (as a potential action) is not possible. I 
discuss this point and argue why I believe this consequence bears no problem 






















Chapter Two: Challenges for Normative Coherence Requirements 
 
2.0: Chapter Introduction 
 In this chapter, I defend normative coherence requirements by 
responding to three questions. These questions will cover various potential 
issues and challenges that have been raised against the idea that coherence 
requirements are normative. Now, this chapter will not offer a general 
argument for the normative source of coherence requirements; arguing this 
point will come in Chapter Three.46 That said, I continue to assume that 
coherence requirements are normative (i.e., that we have a normative reason to 
comply with these requirements) and argue that this assumption does not lead 
to conceptual problems. That said, this chapter unfolds as follows.  
In section 2.1, I will answer the question: Why care about coherence 
requirements? Doing so entails discussing why coherence requirements are 
necessary in an account of rationality as well as how these requirements are 
supposed to function in our deliberations. I primarily rely on Worsnip’s work 
in this section. In section 2.2, I respond to the question: Do normative coherence 
requirements lead to bootstrapping and other controversial outcomes? Here I 
advocate for a wide-scope approach to coherence requirements. In doing so, I 
dismiss narrow-scope alternatives due to bootstrapping problems and defend 
the wide-scope approach against the well-known symmetry problem. I also 
address transmission problems raised against the wide-scope view.  
Moving ahead, in section 2.3, I address the question: Are coherence-
based reasons right-kind reasons? In this section I discuss Worsnip’s position as 
well as how my agency-constitutivist defense of normative coherence 
requirements maintains the right-kind reasons distinction. Given this laundry 
list of challenges, my hope is that this chapter defends the idea that normative 





46 Chapter Three effectively responds to Kolodny’s (2005) challenge that there is no reason to 
adhere to coherence requirements in general. 
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2.1: Why Care about Coherence Requirements? 
 As previously mentioned, for this project I grant the existence of 
substantive rationality. I grant that we have moral, epistemic, prudential, etc. 
reasons that, if ignored, entail substantively rational criticism. That said, with 
these reasons on the table is there anything left for coherence requirements to 
do?47 
There is an intuitive sense that, when I act contrary to my best judgment, 
or fail to intend (what I believe to be) the necessary means for my intended end, 
something is very wrong with me. In such cases, I am being irrational. This 
irrationality is, I believe, common ground in most discussions of rationality. 
What I take to be the above challenge is whether there is a need for structural 
requirements dictating that attitudinal incoherence should be avoided. The 
question is, then, whether coherence requirements provide a needed function, 
or whether substantive rationality is enough. 
Addressing this issue affords the opportunity to lay out some 
groundwork for this project. In doing so, I follow Worsnip’s lead on many of 
these points. Rather than offer an original position, the purpose of this section is 
to motivate the discussion of coherence requirements to begin with. That said, 
in section 2.1a, I argue that being substantively rational does not guarantee the 
absence of attitudinal incoherence. Next, in section 2.1b, we see that, thanks to 
Worsnip’s framework, there is conceptual room for considerations of coherence 
to function in our deliberations. Finally, in section 2.1c, I discuss attitudinal 
incoherence as an evaluative criticism. If correct, I believe this section offers a 
strong position in favor of the utility and function of coherence requirements. 
Let us begin. 
 
2.1a: Substantively Rational Attitudinal Incoherence 
It is believed by some48 that responding correctly to our substantive 
normative reasons alone guarantees the coherence of our attitudes. If so, then as 
long as we are not substantively irrational, we are not structurally incoherent. I 
 
47 This question echoes Kolodny’s comment that such requirements are little more than an odd 
concern for “psychic tidiness” (2007: 241). 
 
48 See Kolodny (2005) and Lord (2014) among others.  
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think Worsnip shows this claim to be false. Consider the following permissive 
cases.  
 
[S]uppose that one is at a restaurant and that there are three 
available dishes, each delicious in its own, different way. It's 
plausible that in some such cases, one's reasons are permissive 
with respect to one's preferences: no particular pairwise 
preference would be substantively irrational. From that, it follows 
that there's no substantive irrationality in preferring dish A to 
dish B, or in preferring dish B to dish C, or in preferring dish C to 
dish A. But it's structurally irrational to have all of these 
preferences together. […] 
[S]uppose that given one's evidence, one may permissibly assign 
some proposition p a credence anywhere between 0.64 and 0.65 -- 
and therefore, that one may permissibly assign not-p a credence 
anywhere between 0.35 and 0.36. It follows that it's substantively 
rational to assign p a credence of 0.64, and substantively rational 
to assign not-p a credence of 0.35. But it's structurally irrational to 
have both of these credences. (Worsnip [2018c]) 
 
The above examples intuitively show that responding to substantive reasons 
alone cannot guarantee attitudinal coherence.49 Where the first example violates 
the transitive preference requirement, we can understand the second example 
to violate the modus ponens requirement.50 As seen in Chapter One, cyclical 
preferences are incoherent because they are unintelligible under conditions of 
full transparency. In the same way, violating the modus ponens requirement is 
equally incoherent. Nevertheless, it seems that, in these cases, responding to 
 
49 In addition to the examples above, consider Kiesewetter’s (2017: 286-287) concession that 
substantive rationality alone cannot account for a categorical form of the instrumental 
requirement—i.e., one that does not allow for various exceptions where incoherence is 
tolerated. In Chapter Three, I will argue for the normativity of coherence requirements, which 
does not allow for exceptions of “rational” incoherence. 
 
50 Taking for granted the credence value relationship cred(¬𝑝) = 1 – cred(𝑝), we can say that the 
credence value of 𝑝 implies the credence value of ¬𝑝. Now, let P: {cred(𝑝) = 0.64} and Q: 
{cred(¬𝑝) = 0.36}. Then, P → Q, P ⊢ Q. So, it is incoherent to believe that 𝑝 has a credence value 
of 0.64 and ¬𝑝 has a credence value of 0.35. 
 25 
our substantive permissive reasons alone does not guarantee that we avoid 
attitudinal incoherence. For substantive rationality evaluates the rational status 
of attitudes individually and not by how these attitudes “fit together.”51 In order 
to classify such cases as illustrations of irrationality, it seems that we do need 
structural norms prohibiting attitudinal incoherence.52 
 From the above, I think that cases like these provide a genuine need for 
coherence requirements.53 For we need a way of accounting for such cases as 
instances of irrationality. However, at this point, I think it prudent to discuss 
briefly how I understand substantive reasons and complying with coherence 
requirements to work together.  
 
2.1b: Structuring Deliberation with Coherence-Based Reasons 
As I see it, coherence requirements play a necessary role in our 
deliberations by allowing a structural framework for us to deliberate over 
substantive issues. As prohibitions of attitudinal incoherence, coherence 
requirements prescribe that, whatever attitudes we have, they ought to be 
structured in coherent ways. As Worsnip writes,  
 
[C]onsiderations of coherence, rather than constituting reasons for 
individual attitudes, constitute reasons to structure deliberation in 
certain ways: specifically, to treat incoherent combinations as off-
 
51 To say otherwise would entail claiming that substantive rationality has its own structural 
requirements. Saying that {¬𝑝 is false} because {𝑝 is true}, or vice versa, implicitly relies on the 
structural claim that we cannot have {	𝑝 ∧ ¬𝑝}. And if substantive rationality has its own 
structural requirements, then the normative coherence requirements question is moot. For even 
reason-response theorists would have to commit to some form of coherence requirements. 
 
52 One may protest that, in these cases, we still fail to respond to our instrumental reason to take 
the necessary means to our end. As this argument for either case will effectively run the same 
way, I have chosen to discuss only the first case. In cases of preference reasoning, the purpose of 
considering what dish I prefer over others is to make a decision about what I will order. That said, 
by reasoning in a circle, I fail to respond correctly to my instrumental reason to take the 
necessary means to decide what I will order. I think this response fails for the following reason: 
It might be the case that, if we have a decisive reason to intend some end, this argument holds 
water; however, as Kiesewetter argues, if (as in numerous cases) our reason to decide what to 
order is not a decisive reason, then we no longer necessarily have an instrumental reason to take 
the necessary means to decide what to order (2017: 263-268). I imagine the same problem will 
hold when discussing the credence case. Because of this issue, I find that substantive rationality 
still fails to guarantee attitudinal coherence in permissive cases.  
 
53 For a more in-depth discussion on this point including other example types, see Worsnip 
(2018b). 
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limits, and to focus one’s deliberation on adjudicating between the 
coherent combinations. (21) 
 
There is a nice separation of powers here. Coherence requirements prohibit 
incoherent attitude combinations, and (of the coherent combinations left 
available) substantive reasons determine what particular attitudes we ought to 
have. Worsnip’s idea here is a response to Kolodny’s challenge that 
considerations of coherence have no place in our deliberations (2005: 547-8).54 
Given the examples (in 2.1a) where substantive reasons fail to account for 
attitudinal incoherence, Worsnip makes a strong case for the utility of 
coherence requirements. Coherence requirements govern acceptable attitude 
structure; substantive reasons govern acceptable attitudes.  
Now, what I have rehearsed about Worsnip’s position so far in no way 
justifies the normativity of coherence requirements. As I have said, this 
justification will come later in Chapter Three, where I repackage Worsnip’s 
position within an agency-constitutivist framework. That said, I continue to use 
Worsnip’s dualist framework throughout this chapter. Moving forward in this 
section, I now discuss a further question: what kind of irrationality is attitudinal 
incoherence? 
 
2.1c: Structural Irrationality as Evaluative Criticism 
  Following Worsnip, we can think of the rational criticism associated with 
attitudinal incoherence as evaluative—as pointing directly to the presence of 
attitudes that “don’t cohere, or fit together, or “make sense” in combination” 
(2020: 13). Understood in this way, attitudinal incoherence (structural 
irrationality) is not a failure to respond to reasons. Instead, this irrationality is a 
 
54 Kolodny argues that, since we will have substantive reasons for our particular attitudes, 
having a second reason (that choosing attitude 𝑋 will make my attitudes jointly coherent) is 
superfluous. More so, this second coherence-based reason would be the “wrong kind” of reason 
(i.e., because of some value in attitudinal coherence rather than the substantive reasons that 
directly bear on the justification of 𝑋). Right away, we can see that the first issue (that we would 
have an unnecessary second reason for 𝑋) resolves itself under Worsnip’s account. For Worsnip 
claims that our coherence-based reasons are reasons for coherent attitude structures, not for 
particular attitudes. I believe Worsnip succeeds against the second, “wrong-kind” reason 
challenge as well (Worsnip 2020: 24-28). I further discuss right-kind reasons in Section 2.3.   
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failure to structure our attitudes properly, and in this way is evaluative in nature. 
Okay, why think this? 
 First, criticisms using evaluative standards are well-known. Think of 
evaluative judgments of skill for instance. Dancing, playing music, carpentry 
work, philosophical research, and many more, are all activities criticizable in 
evaluative ways. Given that we are understanding coherence requirements to 
constitute reasons to structure our deliberations in coherent ways, it seems 
natural to understand structural rationality as an evaluative standard. For 
complying with coherence requirements equates to meeting a “certain mental 
performance” (23). 
Second, how well I 𝜙 is a distinctly different judgment from whether or 
not I ought to 𝜙. If I am trying to determine whether I should take up dancing, 
looking to my substantive reasons seems the natural choice. Once I am dancing, 
however, my deliberation over how well I am performing seems a very 
different (structural) matter. 
 Third, as Worsnip points out, classifying evaluative criticism in terms of 
failing to respond to reasons is problematic. Considering beauty, Worsnip 
writes,  
 
[E]ven if there are reasons to bring about beautiful things, it’s not 
[the case] that what it is to be beautiful is to be responsive to 
beauty-reasons; and so, it’s not that criticism of someone or 
something as ugly just is a charge of their having failed to respond 
to beauty-reasons. (13) 
 
I think this point has force to it. For we can meet (and fail to meet) evaluative 
standards without responding to reasons. Assuming that there is a genuine 
standard of beauty, it is “possible to be beautiful without having made oneself 
so in response to a beauty-reason” (11). That said, if structural irrationality is a 
failure to meet some evaluative standard, then we need not associate this 
criticism with a failure to respond to reasons. This kind of rational criticism can 




Disarming a Challenge to Evaluative Standards 
That said, Benjamin Kiesewetter (2017: 33-36) poses a challenge to 
thinking that rational criticism could be accounted for by an evaluative 
standard. As I understand Kiesewetter, his argument runs in the following way: 
 
1. If rational criticism is based on an evaluative standard, then this 
standard must be provided by facts about the well-functioning of our 
rational capacities (34). 
2. Then our failure to meet this evaluative standard is a failure of our 
rational capacities (35). 
3. Therefore, whenever we fail to meet this evaluative standard, we also fail 
to have the proper functioning rational capacity to be rationally 
accountable (36).  
 
I think this argument fails.55 The problem, as I see it, is that there is a conflation 
between “our failure to meet a rationally evaluative standard” and a “failure of 
the capacity itself.” Following Worsnip’s account, the evaluative standard 
invoked in structurally rational criticism is proper (coherent) deliberation. That 
said, the standard itself is not our capacity to meet that standard. All other 
things being equal, my failure in a given moment to perform simple 
mathematical computations does itself entail my incapacity to do so. Similarly, 
our failure to structure coherently our deliberations in a given moment does not 
entail that we lack the capacity to do so.56 We simply made a mistake.57 In 
Worsnip’s terminology, we failed to be under conditions of full transparency 
about our attitudes, and because of this fact, we failed to deliberate properly.58  
 
55 To be fair to Kiesewetter, his criticism here is raised specifically against Raz’s (2005) argument 
that rational criticism references an evaluative standard. That said, I leave aside whether my 
criticism lands on Kiesewetter, Raz, or both.  
 
56 Not unless our failure is due to being knocked unconscious or killed or remote controlled by a 
mad scientist/evil demon, etc. However, these cases are, of course, excluded because they 
violate the failure precondition for normative requirements.  
 
57 As an example of this, recall Worsnip’s preference reasoning cases wherein we deliberate in 
circles about what food to order (Section 2.1a). With respect to any one of our preference pairs, 
we deliberate fine. It is just that, overall (across all the preferences), we fail to deliberate 
properly.  
 
58 Recall (from Chapter One: Section 1.1) that, under conditions of “full transparency,” we hold 
a combination of mental states without the aid of “self-deception, mental fragmentation, or any 
failure of self-knowledge” pertaining to our attitudes (Worsnip 2018a: 188). In other words, we 
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The Consistency of Evaluative Structural Rationality and Reason-Based Normativity 
As a final note, we should not worry that a reason-based account of 
normativity is inconsistent with the above picture of evaluative criticism. The 
fact that Worsnip describes the normativity of his coherence requirements in 
terms of reasons does not entail that we need to respond to these reasons 
directly. The fact that structurally rational criticism now comes apart from any 
failure to respond to reasons means that we can separate the question of 
criticism from the question of whether that criticism has genuine normative 
force. Think of chess (or some other rule-governed activity). When playing 
chess, if I move my bishop in an “L” shaped way, you can criticize me for doing 
so. Nevertheless, this fact does not entail that the rules of chess are normative. 
More to the point: even if chess were normative, the criticism I receive need not 
be understood as my failure to respond to the reason that a bishop is not a 
knight, etc. We can simply point directly to my failure to play the game 
correctly. Returning to attitudinal incoherence, Worsnip writes,  
 
on a perfectly consistent picture, we can note that charging 
someone with structural irrationality expresses a kind of 
evaluative criticism, and then go on to ask—separately—whether 
the fact that some state would be irrational (and, thus, subject to 
that kind of evaluative criticism) has any normative significance: 
whether it is, for example, a reason not to be in that state, or to do 
something that would result in one’s not being in it. (2020: 13-14) 
 
Going forward, I understand the relation between reasons and coherence 
requirements (if justifiable) to be explanatory of the normative character of 
structurally rational criticism—not the mechanisms that determine this 
criticism. We are structurally irrational when we fail to structure our attitudes 
in coherent ways. Structural rationality is normative when we can justifiably 
say that there are reasons why we ought to avoid attitudinal incoherence. That 
 
are fully transparent about our attitudes when we are sufficiently “clear eyed” about how those 
attitudes relate to one another.  
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said, I think we now have a decent picture of the view I am defending. It is now 
time to address further potential criticisms of coherence requirements.  
 
2.2: Do Coherence Requirements Lead to Bootstrapping and other  
Controversial Outcomes? 
Coherence requirements predominantly fall under one of two scope 
frameworks: narrow and wide. Narrow-scope coherence requirements follow 
an if-then relation, requiring the adoption of specific consequent attitudes based 
on our antecedent attitudes. Alternatively, the wide-scope approach makes 
antecedent attitudes alterable, allowing various ways to satisfying coherence 
requirements. I have opted for the wide-scope approach. That said, I need to 
say a bit about why. To that end, in (section 2.2a) I discuss why I find the 
narrow-scope approach to coherence requirements problematic. Afterward, (in 
section 2.2b) I will discuss a well-known challenge for the wide-scope view and 
(in section 2.2c) show how a dualist perspective on rationality overcomes this 
problem. Finally, (in sections 2.2c and 2.2d) I address and meet two further 
challenges for wide-scope coherence requirements. 
 
2.2a: Narrow-Scope Requirements and Bootstrapping 
A strong case against narrow-scope coherence requirements is that they 
invite bootstrapping problems. Bootstrapping occurs when coherence 
requirements allow our present attitudes to generate oughts and normative 
reasons for further attitudes. These cases are problematic. For, as Benjamin 
Kiesewetter says, “[y]ou cannot, just by adopting some crazy belief about what 
you ought to do, make it the case that you really ought to do it” (2017: 83). 
Furthermore, as we will see, the existence of bootstrapped oughts and reasons 
also leads to incoherent instruction (John Brunero 2020: 38-45). How is 
bootstrapping possible? 
Narrow-scope coherence requirements entail bootstrapping problems 
because of their if-then structure. Narrow-scope coherence requirements take 
the form: if certain antecedent attitudes are present, then the adoption of certain 
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consequent attitudes is required. Consider narrow-scope versions of the 
instrumental and practical enkratic requirements.59 
 
Narrow-Scope Instrumental Requirement (𝐼𝑅%&): If we intend to 𝜙, and we 
believe that 𝜓-ing is a necessary means for 𝜙-ing, then we ought to 
intend to 𝜓. 
 
Narrow-Scope Practical Enkratic Requirement (𝑃𝐸𝑅%&): If we judge that we 
ought to 𝜙, then we ought to intend to 𝜙. 
 
Both these requirements follow the “if antecedent, then consequent” form. The 
problem is, of course, that satisfying the antecedents of narrow-scope coherence 
requirements requires only that we have specific attitudes—not that having those 
attitudes is justified. That said, we can end up with problematic cases where 
unjustified attitudes somehow justify the adoption of other attitudes. 
Illustrating this point, consider an example by Kiesewetter. Suppose you 
judge 
 
that you ought to put all your efforts into building a machine 
which enables you to travel through time and meet Elvis Presley. 
So let us suppose that you ought not to put all your efforts into 
this project, and consequently ought not to intend to do so, but 
you sincerely believe you ought to do it. (2017: 82) 
 
As Kiesewetter points out, 𝑃𝐸𝑅%& leads to “the conclusion that you ought to 
intend to put all your efforts into this crazy project” (82).60 Furthermore, if, 
following the 𝑃𝐸𝑅%& prescription, an intention to build the time machine is 
 
59 Since my aim is to defend a unified account of all six coherence requirements described in the 
previous chapter, it is enough to consider potential problems one or two of the requirements in 
narrow-scope form. For I think a piecemeal defense of a supposed unified account of coherence 
requirements would be too ad hoc.  
 
60 While I put the practical enkratic requirement in terms of judgments, Kiesewetter words it 
more commonly in terms of beliefs about what we ought to do. Nevertheless, the problematic 
outcome remains the same.  
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formed, 𝐼𝑅%& then prescribes that the necessary means to build the time 
machine ought to be intended. In both cases the example assumes that building 
a time machine is not possible. Thus, any belief that building the time machine 
is possible, any judgment that we ought to do so, and any intention to do so, is 
unjustified and irrational.61  
 One potential problem with arguments like the above is that they 
implicitly rely on both value judgments and intuitions about what is possible. 
What if we are wrong that time travel is impossible, and what if it could be the 
case that we ought to go back and talk to Elvis? If so, bootstrapping 
counterexamples like the above come up short (or at least the jury is out on 
what these examples show). Along these same lines, we cannot say that 
coherence requirement instruction leads to normatively unacceptable 
conclusions without further arguments for why those conclusions are actually 
unacceptable.62  
 Recognizing this issue, Brunero recasts the bootstrapping challenge as 
the claim that normative narrow-scope coherence requirements produce 
incoherent advice.63 A brief summation of one of Brunero’s examples should 
illustrate the challenge: 
 
Imagine we intend to travel to Chicago by plane and only two 
airlines are available: United and Delta. We judge that Delta is the 
better option. Nevertheless, we intend to fly United. Since we 
judge that Delta is the better option, 𝑃𝐸𝑅%& tells us we ought to 
intend to fly Delta. Yet, since we intend to fly United, 𝐼𝑅%& tells us 
 
61 If you believe that building a time machine is possible, then start again with a different 
premise about something you believe is not possible. The same kind of counterexample will 
follow.  
 
62 Imagine that we believe that killing someone is the necessary means for achieving some 
normatively justified end. The “ought” that the narrow-scope instrumental requirement gives 
us to intend the means (killing someone) is unacceptable only if it is true that killing is wrong, 
and that truth relies on definitively proving a moral position where killing is an unjust action. 
While I do believe that killing is morally wrong, the point remains the same.  
 
63 As Brunero argues, formulating the bootstrapping challenge this way avoids relying “upon 
controversial intuitions about whether immoral intentions […] generate reasons” (2020: 33). 
 
 33 
that we ought to fly United. So, it seems that we ought to intend 
to fly Delta and we ought to fly United.64 
 
As Brunero rightly points out, the above conclusion “is incoherent advice” 
(2020: 39). The effectiveness of Brunero’s example is that it avoids referencing 
any potentially problematic moral positions or intuitions about what is 
possible. Furthermore, Brunero’s bootstrapping challenge is stronger than 
alternative versions because it illustrates a case where coherence requirements 
literally tell us we ought to be incoherent! 
 As seen above, narrow-scope coherence requirements run into trouble. In 
some cases, these requirements somehow justify consequent attitudes with 
unjustified (or even irrational) antecedent attitudes. In other cases, these 
requirements actually propose incoherent advice. So, we definitely have a 
problem.  
 One response to bootstrapping problems is to say that coherence 
requirements prescribe subjective “oughts” only. If correct, then these 
requirements would not bootstrap into existence any other (namely objective) 
kind of ought.65 The problem, however, is that this approach unintentionally 
undermines the normative status of the requirements in question. Here is why. 
The problem is that we do not have a good explanation about what 
subjective oughts normatively amount to. First, if by “subjective oughts” we 
mean that coherence requirements determine what attitude combinations we 
ought to have based on our subjective perspective, then we lose the ability to 
criticize one another rationally. For having a particular set of attitudes could be 
rational from our perspective, yet irrational from the perspective of others.66 In 
 
64 See Brunero (2020: 39) for the original formulation of this example. 
 
65 See Way (2009), Schroeder (2009), Parfit (2011: 33–34), among others for versions of the 
subjective ought strategy for select coherence requirements.   
 
66 This issue of rational criticism equally challenges an earlier response to bootstrapping 
objections by Schroeder (2004). This approach, which Schroeder has since abandoned, argues 
that, instead of “oughts,” coherence principles tell us only that we have a reason to adopt certain 
attitudes based on the attitudes we already have. However, these reasons can be outweighed in 
various cases. As Kiesewetter writes, the reasons strategy “cannot account for the criticism that 
is commonly associated with irrationality” (2017: 85). Schroeder also concedes to this point 
(2009: 232).  
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order to have rational criticism, the “ought” in question needs to reference an 
objective sense of ought.67 
Another explanation might be that subjective ought prescriptions are 
counterfactual claims about objective oughts. If, given our present attitudes, we 
subjectively ought to adopt further attitudes, then this is the case when our 
original attitudes are true or justified. However, this explanation also seems to 
undermine the normative status of coherence principles. For, as Stephen Finlay 
points out, if “‘subjectively ought’ simply means ‘objectively ought if one’s 
beliefs are true,’ then we may doubt the normativity of the principle wherever 
those beliefs are false” (2010: 72). So once again, we run into trouble.  
A further issue about this strategy is that it does not actually avoid the 
bootstrapping problem to begin with. Say the objective ought strategy 
somehow avoids the lack of rational criticism and generalizability above. Say 
that subjective oughts can be shown to represent genuine normative 
requirements. If so, then we have merely reinvented the original bootstrapping 
problem, albeit now for subjective oughts. For it will be the case, as Kiesewetter 
points out, that these requirements will “entail that just by adopting an attitude 
for no reason, we can make it the case that we stand under a genuinely 
normative requirement to adopt some other attitude” (2017: 87). So, we have 
not fixed the bootstrapping problem, only recast it.  
Because of these issues, I set the narrow-scope approach aside in favor of 
a wide-scope account of coherence requirements. That said, there remains a 
well-known challenge against wide-scope accounts. Therefore, in advocating 
for wide-scope coherence requirements, I must address this challenge.  
 
2.2b: Wide-Scope Requirements and the Symmetry Problem 
 Wide-scope coherence requirements offer an alternative to the narrow-
scope framework. This framework avoids the bootstrapping issue because, 
rather than require that we be in some consequent state, wide-scope 
requirements also alternatively allow us to revise our antecedent state 
(Kiesewetter 2017: 88, 138).  Nevertheless, this symmetrical advantage that 
 
67 By an “objective” ought, I mean an “all-things-considered” ought—an ought that, in a given 
context, cannot be overridden (See Dissertation Program: Section 0.2).  
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wide-scope requirements possess over narrow-scope versions is considered by 
many to be a problem in its own right.68 As Kiesewetter’s frames the issue, the  
 
symmetry of wide-scope requirements […] poses a problem for 
the wide-scope account, for it seems that there is an asymmetry 
between different ways of satisfying structural requirements of 
rationality that wide-scope requirements cannot capture. (138-
139). 
 
As I see it, the complaint is this: the symmetrical nature of satisfying wide-
scope coherence requirements allows that we can satisfy these requirements in 
ways that are obviously irrational. And because of this fact, wide-scope 
requirements fail as rational requirements. Call this the Symmetry Problem. That 
said, the asymmetry lost in the wide-scope approach is the fact that not all 
means of achieving attitudinal coherence are created equal—there are right and 
wrong ways of getting there.  
To illustrate this point, consider the wide-scope instrumental 
requirement (𝐼𝑅). Below are two equivalent ways the writing 𝐼𝑅—the first as a 
prohibition (my preference), the second as a disjunctive ought (more common 
form). That said, 𝐼𝑅 states that we ought 
 
(1): to not [intend to 𝜙, believe that 𝜓-ing is a necessary means for 𝜙-ing, 
and fail to intend to 𝜓]. 
 
(2): to [not intend to 𝜙, or not believe that 𝜓-ing is a necessary means for 
𝜙-ing, or intend to 𝜓].69 
 
Let us focus on the latter iteration of 𝐼𝑅 for a moment. Because 𝐼𝑅 is understood 
as an unconditional requirement, advocates of the symmetry challenge seem to 
 
68 See Kolodny (2005), Schroeder (2004), Bedke (2009: 687-689), and Finlay (2010: 70-71) among 
others for different iterations of the challenge I discuss.  
 
69 Recall that, by De Morgan’s Laws, both expressions are equivalent (Chartrand et al. 2013: 
112). 
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claim that the normativity of 𝐼𝑅 entails that all means of satisfying this 
requirement are rationally permissible for all cases.  
If this claim is true, then we get problem cases like the following. Let us 
say that 𝜙 is {attend a 9:00AM event on time}, 𝜓 is {wake up before 9:00AM}, 
and our instrumental belief is {waking up before 9:00AM is necessary to attend 
a 9:00AM event on time}. Now let us say we intend to 𝜙. According to 𝐼𝑅, we 
have three options. We can either intend to wake up before the event, cease to 
intend to go to the event on time, or cease to believe that waking up before the 
event is necessary for attending the event on time. According to 𝐼𝑅, then, we are 
rationally permitted to drop our instrumental belief while retaining our 
intention to 𝜙. Of course, this choice is irrational and absurd. 
Alternatively, consider a moral application of the practical enkratic 
requirement (𝑃𝐸𝑅). In its disjunctive form, 𝑃𝐸𝑅 says that we ought to [not judge 
that we ought to 𝜙 or intend to 𝜙]. Following the same argument as before, 
Mark Schroder writes that a 
 
problem for Wide-Scoping is that it is symmetric. It doesn’t 
distinguish between acting in accordance with your moral beliefs 
and adopting moral beliefs in accordance with your actions, and 
as a result it fails to distinguish between following your 
conscience and the distinctive vice of rationalization. (2009: 227) 
 
Changing our judgment about what we ought to do simply because we lack the 
intention to follow through seems an irrationally backward means of satisfying 
𝑃𝐸𝑅. And as seen above, such a means allows for immoral rationalizations.70 
Once again, there is a clear sense in which satisfying 𝑃𝐸𝑅 seems problematically 
symmetrical. For even in non-moral cases, ceasing “to believe that you ought to 
do something on the basis of your lack of intention to do it […] is not a rational 
process; it is wishful thinking” (Kiesewetter 2017: 141).  
 Okay, so this is the symmetry problem for wide-scope accounts of 
coherence requirements. As stated, this challenge may seem significant. 
 
70 An equally problematic situations arise in the same way with the doxastic enkratic 
requirement in cases where we revise our evidential judgments to suit our beliefs.   
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However, there is a straightforward way of dismissing this worry, which I now 
discuss.  
 
2.2c: Substantive Reasons Guiding Coherence Requirement Satisfaction 
 I think the best way to dismiss the symmetry problem is to argue that 
wide-scope coherence requirements need not, on their own, prescribe how we 
ought to satisfy them—only that we ought to avoid incoherent attitude combinations. 
We should not think that satisfying coherence requirements alone make our 
actions rationally permissible. It is just the case that, when we satisfy these 
requirements, we avoid the further rational criticism associated with holding 
incoherent attitude combinations.  
 This point brings us back to the different ways we can equivalently write 
wide-scope coherence requirements. Consider again the instrumental 
requirement (𝐼𝑅), which states that we ought 
 
(1): to not [intend to 𝜙, and believe that 𝜓-ing is a necessary means for 𝜙-
ing, and not intend to 𝜓]. 
 
(2): to [not intend to 𝜙, or not believe that 𝜓-ing is a necessary means for 
𝜙-ing, or intend to 𝜓]. 
 
That we ought (1) does not necessarily entail that we ought to (or that it is 
permissible to) do so by any means in all contexts.71 All that is being said is that, in 
all contexts, there will be a means of satisfying (1) that we ought to pursue. 
Because of this, and that (1) and (2) are equivalent, we can see that a wide-scope 
account need not commit to saying that satisfying 𝐼𝑅 is rationally permitted by 
 
71 There are various ways of satisfying any one wide-scope coherence requirement. This fact 
shows that the total set of means for satisfying any one of these requirements is not a set of 
necessary means (choosing at least one option is sufficient). Therefore, the claim that we have a 
reason for all means of satisfying a wide-scope coherence requirement in all contexts seems to 
rely on a liberal transmission principle. However, as Kiesewetter and Gertken (2020) conclude, 
liberal transmission is untenable as a normative principle. Instead, we must settle for the more 
conservative transmission principle, Generic Instrumental Reason (GIR): “If 𝐴 has a final reason 
to 𝜙, then 𝐴 has a reason to take means to 𝜙-ing” (2020: 7). As Kiesewetter and Gertken point 
out, however, GIR “allows transmission to a reason for the act-type of taking a means, but not 
for particular means” (13). 
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any of the listed means in all contexts—not as long as we can supply the 
asymmetrical guidance (of choosing the “right” option) by further rational 
principles.72 The same point follows for the other wide-scope coherence 
requirements.  
 That said, I do not propose that we offer any further structural 
principles. Instead, following Worsnip, I believe we should allow our 
substantive reasons to do the work of determining how we ought to satisfy 
coherence requirements—i.e., in what way we should avoid attitudinal 
incoherence in different contexts.73 By prescribing to a dualist account of 
rationality, we have access to both our coherence requirements and substantive 
reasons. On Worsnip’s account of coherence requirements, we should 
understand these requirements as prohibitions on holding incoherent 
combinations of attitudes. In this way, “facts about one’s existing attitudes, and 
the incoherence thereof, should guide the way one structures one’s 
deliberation” (2020: 22, fn. 61). When deliberating on some issue, coherence 
requirements guide in the sense of rationally allowing coherent attitude 
combinations only. Nevertheless, when it comes down to deciding which 
coherent combination we ought to choose, “the only considerations that should 
then appear are the substantive” ones (22, fn. 61).  
 
72 On this point, wide-scope proponents have offered additional basing principles. For example, 
Broome writes, we can “account for this asymmetry by means of a further requirement of 
rationality” (2013: 139-140). In the same vein, Way has also said that the “Wide-Scope view can 
allow that rationality also requires you to form and sustain your attitudes in the right sort of 
way, where this is specified by independent basing principles” (2011: 232). Thus, we add 
further structural requirements either to (1) rule out controversial coherence requirement 
satisfaction or (2) determine which means of satisfaction are correct. It remains debatable, 
however, whether accounting for asymmetrical guidance within accounts of structural 
rationality effectively reduces wide-scope requirements to narrow-scope requirements. At this 
time, I will not weigh in on this issue. For I think there is a more straightforward solution that 
solves the symmetry problem. See Way (2011), Kolodny (2005: 520-1), and Kiesewetter (2017: 
142-146) for further discussion on this point. 
 
73 We may think that substantive rationality is doing too much work to justify the need for 
coherence requirements. I do not think so. First, insofar as we understand coherence 
requirements as requirements of structural rationality, it makes sense that these requirements 
govern structure and not which particular attitudes we have. Therefore, relegating which 
attitudes we ought (and ought not) to have in particular contexts up to substantive rationality 
can be seen as a natural way to go. Second, we have already seen the insufficiency of 
substantive requirements in permissive cases (Section 2.1a). Third, as Worsnip briefly notes, 
even without permissive cases, there is something problematic about deliberation that does not 
rule out in advance incoherent attitude combinations (2020: 30). We should not have to consider 
incoherent attitude combinations genuinely—their incoherence should be enough or rule them 
out as a possibility.  
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 Consider a series of bridges stretching across a gorge in various 
directions. Some of the bridges are out, and as such, the transit authority has 
marked them with signs. Given these signs, it is obvious that these paths are 
unadvisable. But as far as deciding which available bridge to take, these signs 
offer no further guidance. For once we have ruled out the unadvisable routes, 
which available bridge to take will be decided based on where we ought to go 
today (not where we should not go).  
I think this is an effective way of understanding wide-scope coherence 
requirements—as signposts prohibiting attitudinal incoherence. These 
requirements serve their purpose insofar as they rule out incoherent attitude 
combinations; they need not do more than this. Once we are limited to 
“structurally coherent” options, our moral, epistemic, prudential, (etc.) reasons 
will naturally take us the rest of the way to deciding what to do in any given 
context.74  
In this way, we need not think of the disjunctive form of wide-scope 
coherence requirements as universally permissible options in all contexts. 
Rather, we can interpret these options as the ways in which wide-scope 
coherence requirements combine with substantive requirements in contextually 
dependent ways. In all cases we ought to avoid attitudinal incoherence. In any 
particular case, how we ought to satisfy wide-scope coherence requirements 
will be a question for substantive rationality. 
That said, I think Worsnip’s prohibitional account of wide-scope 
coherence requirements can avoid the symmetry problem as discussed above. 
That said, there is another potential challenge that needs addressing. I turn to 
this challenge now.  
 
 
74 Understood this way, I do not think that wide-scope requirements will necessarily reduce to 
narrow-scope versions. Kiesewetter, a proponent of the symmetry challenge, writes: “Insofar as 
basing asymmetries pose a problem for the wide-scope view at all, it must be because of a 
principled reason that structural requirements of rationality that correspond to the structural 
irrationality claims have to reflect such basing asymmetries” (143). Follow Worsnip, I have just 
shown that this is not the case if we allow for both structural and substantive requirements to 
work together in our deliberations. Understood as such, wide-scope coherence requirements are 
designed only to prohibit attitudinal coherence, unlike their narrow-scope counterparts that 
prescribe particular attitudes (given antecedent conditions). As long as we relegate 
asymmetrical guidance to our substantive reasons, we need not think that wide-scope 
requirements reduce to narrow-scope versions.  
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2.2d: Coherence Requirements and Liberal Transmission 
 Kiesewetter has claimed that coherence requirements become 
normatively problematic when combined with the liberal transmission 
principle.75 The liberal transmission principle states that, if we have a definitive 
reason to intend some end 𝜙, and 𝜓-ing is some means to 𝜙, then we also have 
an instrumental reason to 𝜓.  
 
Liberal Transmission (𝐿𝑇): If we have an intrinsic [non-instrumental] 
reason to 𝜙, and 𝜓-ing is a means for us to 𝜙, then we have a reason to 𝜓 
(Kiesewetter 2017: 92). 
 
Kiesewetter uses this principle to undermine coherence requirements by taking 
𝜙 to be the satisfaction of a particular coherence requirement. Granted, on 
Worsnip’s account we do not have a prior reason to satisfy coherence 
requirements. Nevertheless, Worsnip’s position does say that coherence 
requirements constitute reasons to structure our deliberations in coherent ways 
(2020: 21). Furthermore, this “structuring” amounts to meeting the satisfaction 
conditions of these requirements. Thus, it seems that we can run Kiesewetter’s 
argument for taking the means to structure our deliberations in coherent ways. 
For brevity’s sake, then, I will discuss this issue in terms of having a reason to 
comply with coherence requirements.   
Assuming that coherence requirements are normative, we have a reason 
to follow those requirements. Therefore, if 𝜙-ing is satisfying one of these 
normative requirements, then we have a reason to 𝜙. From here, if 𝐿𝑇 is true, 
we also have a reason to 𝜓—where 𝜓 is any and all means for satisfying that 
coherence requirement (Kiesewetter 2017: 92-95). If this argument is sound, 
then the normative status of any particular coherence requirement ends up 
justifying any (including controversial) means of satisfying that requirement. If 
Kiesewetter is correct, then the wide-scope view has a serious problem. 
 
75 In Kiesewetter’s defense, I am here responding to older (2017) criticism that I believe 
Kiesewetter himself would now retract. For Kiesewetter and Gertken (2020) abandon (and 
argue against) the liberal transmission principle used here. Nevertheless, I offer an independent 
argument against the current criticism.  
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Consider my practical enkratic requirement 𝑃𝐸𝑅. Imagine that we judge 
that we ought to save a drowning child, but nevertheless we do not intend to 
follow through. In this case we are violating 𝑃𝐸𝑅. If 𝑃𝐸𝑅 is normative, then we 
have a reason to satisfy it. While 𝑃𝐸𝑅 does not explicitly prescribe dropping our 
judgment that we ought to save the drowning child, this option does technically 
satisfy 𝑃𝐸𝑅 (for our attitudes would no longer be incoherent in the relevant 
sense). Therefore, 𝐿𝑇 says that, based on 𝑃𝐸𝑅’s normative status, we have a 
reason to drop our judgment that we ought to save the drowning child. 
However, this way of satisfying 𝑃𝐸𝑅 seems normatively unacceptable.  
Nevertheless, hope remains for coherence requirements. Meeting the 
above challenge, I will now reject the use of 𝐿𝑇 as seen above. This rejection 
stems from the fact that 𝐿𝑇’s normative status is conditional on a restricted set 
of means for satisfying ends. And this fact, in turn, precludes the use of 𝐿𝑇 as 
used above. Let us begin.  
First, if 𝐿𝑇 is true, it is true only when the means 𝜓 for satisfying some 
end 𝜙 do not overturn the normative status of 𝜙. Otherwise, 𝐿𝑇 would be 
literally saying that the ends justify any means in the most extreme and 
controversial way. I do not think it is a stretch of anyone’s imagination to see 
the normative difference between helping someone and helping that person by 
killing someone else. The normative acceptance (or lack thereof) of the means 
plays a crucial role on the normative status of the end. In this way, we cannot 
divorce the normative status of an end from the kind of means chosen to realize 
that end. Helping someone and helping someone by killing someone else are 
normatively distinct ends.  
Consider Sue and Karin. Let us assume for the argument that helping 
people is a normatively justified end (i.e., there is a reason to do so) and killing 
people is a normatively unjustified act (i.e., there is no reason to do so). Karin is 
trying to distance herself from a bad relationship, and Sue decides to help. 
Now, Sue could help by offering Karin a place to stay for a while. Alternatively, 
Sue could decide to kill Karin’s partner, releasing Karin from the relationship. 
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Nevertheless, I think it is obviously false to claim, just because Sue has a reason 
to help Karin, that Sue in turn has a reason to kill Karin’s partner.76 
Therefore, if 𝐿𝑇 claims that killing Karin’s partner is normatively 
acceptable, then we should conclude that the trouble lies with 𝐿𝑇 and not with 
coherence requirements. Alternatively, if 𝐿𝑇 is not claiming that it is fine to kill 
Karin’s partner, then the means referenced by this principle are restricted to 
avoid such cases. But the only way to guarantee that such cases do not arise is 
to restrict 𝐿𝑇’s application to ends that are normatively justified in reference to a 
restricted set of acceptable means.77  
Therefore, insofar as the satisfaction of a coherence requirement is an 
acceptable (end) input for 𝐿𝑇, the (means) output from 𝐿𝑇 must not be one that 
undermines that normative status of the input (the coherence requirement). 
Since 𝐿𝑇 is only guaranteed to be true when ends and means normatively line 
up correctly, this principle cannot be used to show that other requirements 
break this restricted means-end relationship without invalidating its own use in 
the given context. Therefore, 𝐿𝑇 cannot be used to generate reasons for 
unacceptable means of satisfying other normative requirements. On these 
grounds, I reject the use of 𝐿𝑇 in the above challenge against wide-scope 
coherence requirements.  
That said, I think that wide-scope coherence requirements are successful 
in avoiding scope problems. Assuming the normative status of these 
requirements leads neither to bootstrapping nor to issues of symmetrical 
requirement satisfaction. With this class of objections out of the way, it is time 
to turn to a different kind of challenge.  
 
 
76 As discussed by Kiesewetter and Gertken, similar challenges against 𝐿𝑇 have surfaced under 
the heading of the too many reasons problem (2020: 4-7). See Broome (2005: 7) and Rippon (2011: 17) 
for further examples. Because of this problem, and other issues, Kiesewetter has since backed 
away from 𝐿𝑇, endorsing instead the more conservative principle Generic Instrumental Reason 
(GIR): “If A has a final [non-instrumental] reason to φ, then A has a reason to take means to φ-
ing” (7). This principle, however, does not claim that we have a reason to take any specific means 
to satisfy a normatively justified end, only that we have a reason to act in such a way as to satisfy 
that end. As Kiesewetter and Gertken write, GIR “allows transmission to a reason for the act-type 
of taking a means, but not for particular means.” (13). As understood, GIR poses no problem for 
coherence requirements—since the bootstrapping objection only holds if we generate normative 
reasons for particular means that, in a given context, are controversial. 
 
77 See Kiesewetter and Gertken (2020: 4-5) for a similar point. 
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2.2e: Coherence Requirements and Unalterable Attitudes 
Kiren Setiya (2007) claims that cases exist where the only way to satisfy 
coherence requirements is by adopting a controversial (potentially unjustified) 
attitude. In turn, these cases can also bring coherence requirements into conflict 
with one another. If correct, then Setiya presents a significant challenge to all 
formulations of coherence requirements. The key to Setiya’s argument is the 
claim that sometimes our attitudes are unalterable (i.e., an intention, belief, etc. 
that cannot be changed). If possible, then if these unalterable attitudes are 
unjustified, we will be required to adopt complementing attitudes in support of 
the unalterable ones—a big problem for normative coherence requirements.  
 
Introducing Setiya’s Unalterable Attitude Challenge 
Consider an example given by Setiya involving a supposed unalterable 
attitude.  
Suppose, then, that I decide to smoke, knowing that I need to buy 
cigarettes in order to do so. Perhaps it is true that my intention 
adds a further reason, along with the pleasure of smoking, for me 
to buy them. But these reasons are not conclusive: in the sense of 
‘should’ which reports what there is most or decisive reason to do, 
I know that I should not buy a pack of cigarettes. Doing so would 
be akratic. (2007: 654) 
 
[T]here is nothing I can do to change my intention to smoke or my 
belief about the necessary means: these attitudes are not under my 
control. It follows that the only way in which I can conform to the 
conditional [if I intend to smoke and believe buying cigarettes is a 
necessary means to smoking, then I intend to buy cigarettes] is by 
intending to buy cigarettes. In other words, intending to buy 
cigarettes is a necessary means to the truth of that conditional. 
(660) 
 
Above, we have two coherence requirements involved: the practical enkratic 
requirement (𝑃𝐸𝑅) and the instrumental requirement (𝐼𝑅). Recall that violating 
𝑃𝐸𝑅 involves intending contrary to our best judgment. So, insofar as we intend 
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to buy cigarettes, we are violating 𝑃𝐸𝑅. Nevertheless, since we do intend to 
smoke, not intending to buy cigarettes (what we believe is necessary for 
smoking) violates 𝐼𝑅 since doing so would be instrumentally incoherent. The 
correct solution to this problem should be that we drop our intention to 
smoke.78 However, Setiya has removed that solution by claiming that the 
intention to smoke is unalterable. If correct, then Setiya has placed us between a 
rock and hard place to defend normative coherence requirements. 
 The way forward, as I see it, is to argue that coherence requirements only 
govern combinations of alterable attitudes. If correct, then I read Setiya’s 
“unalterable attitudes” as things like compulsions or desires—attitudes not 
governed by rational requirements. There is nothing irrational about conflicting 
desires. There seems something very irrational about conflicting intentions. So, 
rather than fall into a possible verbal dispute or metalinguistic negotiation with 
Setiya over the term “intention,” I will argue that the cases Setiya considers 
violates the normative preconditions for coherence requirements. For I argue 
that a normative precondition of these requirements is that all the attitudes in 
question are alterable.  
 
Success and Failure Conditions for Normative Requirements 
As a presupposition of normative requirements, there is a common 
understanding that we must have the ability to succeed and fail with respect to 
those requirements. Let 𝑆 be a normative requirement. The function of 𝑆 (or any 
normative requirement) is to guide us toward some behavior 𝑋79 (where 𝑋 
meets the success conditions of 𝑆). However, guiding us towards having 𝑋 
presupposes the ability to guide us toward having 𝑋, which in turn 
presupposes our ability to have 𝑋. If we cannot succeed at having behavior 𝑋, 
then 𝑆 cannot guide us toward having 𝑋. That said, 𝑆’s ability to function as a 
 
78 More controversially, if we found out that recent research had conclusively determined that 
smoking was no longer a health hazard, we could also choose to drop our judgment that we 
should not smoke. Doing so would also solve Setiya’s puzzle. However, for the sake of 
argument, let us assume that our judgment against smoking is correct, and that dropping it 
would be irrational.  
 
79 By calling 𝑋 a behavior, I am being purposefully general to include actions and mental states 
alike. In this way, my argument is meant for theoretical and practical rational requirements 
alike.  
 45 
normative requirement partially relies on our ability to succeed with respect to 
𝑆. 
In a similar way, 𝑆’s function as a normative requirement relies on our 
ability to fail with respect to S. If we cannot fail with respect to 𝑆, then 𝑆’s 
“guidance” over our behavior is superfluous. First, if we cannot not-𝑋, there is 
no need to be guided by 𝑆 to 𝑋. And second, if we cannot fail with respect to 𝑆, 
then 𝑆-based “evaluations” can never provide new information (for the verdict 
will always be the same). Simply put, without the ability to fail with respect to 
𝑆, this requirement reduces to a mere description. 
 That said, applying normative evaluation requires that the evaluated 
party meets the success and failure conditions of the corresponding 
requirement. The party evaluated by 𝑆 must be able to succeed and fail with 
respect to 𝑆. Otherwise (as just discussed), 𝑆 cannot function as a normative 
requirement. With this understanding in place, let us return to Setiya’s 
example.  
 
Dismissing Setiya’s Challenge 
 In Setiya’s example, my intention to smoke is supposedly unalterable, 
making it the case that I either violate the practical enkratic requirement (𝑃𝐸𝑅) 
or violate the instrumental requirement (𝐼𝑅). I violate 𝑃𝐸𝑅 if I intend to buy 
cigarettes (since I judge that I ought not to buy cigarettes) and I violate 𝐼𝑅 if I do 
not intend to buy cigarettes (since I intend to smoke). As said before, the 
rational solution is to drop my intention to smoke—something Setiya claims is 
impossible in this case.  
 Now, while Setiya’s challenge is aimed against coherence requirements, 
this issue involves substantive rationality as well. Why? First, because 
coherence requirements do not govern the justification of particular attitudes 
(in this case, my intention to smoke). They instead govern what attitude 
combinations we ought to avoid. And second, because coherence requirements 
do not govern how they ought to be satisfied, only that they should be satisfied 
in some way. As previously discussed (in section 2.1b), reasons of substantive 
rationality are available to determine how to satisfy both 𝑃𝐸𝑅 and 𝐼𝑅. For, on 
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Worsnip’s account, our substantive reasons determine which coherent attitude 
combinations we ultimately ought to pursue.  
 Lastly, let 𝑆 be a substantive normative requirement that prescribes that 
people ought not to smoke. 𝑆 allows us to reference a normative requirement 
when we say we ought not to buy cigarettes (as it is a means to smoking). 
Furthermore, I take Setiya’s example to rely on some version of 𝑆. For Setiya 
writes, “I know that I should not buy a pack of cigarettes” (2007: 654). 
Additionally, some version of 𝑆 must be in play because, if not, then forming 
the intention to buy cigarettes and dropping my judgment that I ought not to 
buy cigarettes would be a noncontroversial solution to the situation. So, some 
version of 𝑆 is in play.  
Now, with the above setup in mind, I reject Setiya’s challenge based on 
the fact that the conditions of his example violate my ability to succeed with 
respect to the relevant requirements. These requirements are 𝑃𝐸𝑅, 𝐼𝑅, and 𝑆. In 
order for me to succeed rationally in Setiya’s example, I need to avoid being 
practically akratic and instrumentally incoherent. I also need to succeed with 
respect to 𝑆—i.e., I need to both not intend to buy cigarettes and drop my intention 
to smoke.80 However, the latter part of succeeding with respect to 𝑆 (dropping 
my intention to smoke) is exactly what the conditions of Setiya’s challenge 
prohibit. That said, since I cannot succeed with respect to 𝑆, I cannot succeed 
with respect to the example’s requirement set {𝑃𝐸𝑅, 𝐼𝑅, 𝑆}.81 Therefore, since I 
cannot succeed with respect to the relevant normative requirements, Setiya’s 
example disqualifies itself. For his example violates the success condition for 
normative requirements. Agreeing on this point, Kiesewetter writes that “the 
normativity of rationality […] does, I think, require the capacity to modify one’s 
attitudes in the light of reflection” (2017: 100). In order for Setiya’s example to 
be consistent with normative requirements, then the intention to smoke must be 
 
80 Couching the example in this way is important since I need to avoid being incoherent in the 
right way, which involves responding to the right substantive reasons. This point is paramount in 
order for my answer against Setiya to work in alternative cases where only one coherence 
requirement is present. Substantive reasons “keep us on track” so-to-speak by satisfying 
coherence requirements in the right way.  
 
81 Since satisfying 𝑆 is integral to satisfying both 𝑃𝐸𝑅 and 𝐼𝑅, we cannot divorce my ability to 
succeed with respect to 𝑃𝐸𝑅 and 𝐼𝑅 from my ability to succeed with respect to 𝑆. See also the 
previous footnote.  
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modifiable.82 That said, Setiya’s example fails to undermine coherence 
requirements. 
 
Dismissing Kiesewetter’s Amended “Setiya Challenge” 
Nevertheless, Kiesewetter believes an amended version of Setiya’s 
challenge can work against coherence requirements. Here is Kiesewetter’s 
version.  
 
Suppose that Smith intends to smoke, believes that buying a pack 
of cigarettes is necessary in order to do so, but does not intend to 
buy a pack of cigarettes. Smith is capable of revising his intention 
to smoke as well as forming the intention to buy cigarettes; he has 
the relevant capacity of self-governance necessary in order to 
count as violating a reason to be instrumentally rational […]. 
Next, suppose that Jones is exactly like Smith in every 
psychological respect. Jones differs from Smith only in that the 
following counterfactual claim is true about him: were Jones to 
start revising his intention to smoke, someone (perhaps a 
hypnotist or a neuroscientist) would prevent this from happening. 
Since Smith and Jones share the same psychology, and are equally 
guided by their deliberation, it seems that since Smith is self-
governed so is Jones. Hence they are both subject to the 
instrumental requirement. (101) 
 
I find Kiesewetter’s position here odd. Kiesewetter seems to think that the 
above example captures Setiya’s challenge without violating the success and 
failure conditions necessary for following normative requirements. Kiesewetter 
claims that Jones and Smith are relevantly equivalent to one another, and 
because of this fact, if coherence requirements are normative, they apply to both 
persons. However, Kiesewetter’s claim that Smith and Jones are relevantly 
 
82 Once again, I tie the success condition for normative requirements to the set {𝑃𝐸𝑅, 𝐼𝑅, 𝑆} 
because only 𝑆 deals directly with modifying particular attitudes (coherence requirements 
govern attitude combinations) and succeeding with respect to 𝑆 is necessary to succeed with 
respect to the set {𝑃𝐸𝑅, 𝐼𝑅, 𝑆}. 
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equivalent entails the claim that both Smith and Jones both have the ability to 
succeed and fail with respect to coherence requirements. But this last claim is 
obviously false.  
Smith and Jones are not relevantly equivalent such that coherence 
requirements apply to both. Smith has the ability to change his antecedent 
attitudes whereas Jones does not. It makes no relevant difference that, in other 
cases, Jones might be able to change his antecedent attitudes or that he can 
“begin to change them” in the counterfactual case. In the counterfactual case, 
where Jones tries to drop his intention to smoke, outside interference blocks this 
ability. If Jones cannot succeed at changing his intention to smoke, he simply 
does not have the ability to change this attitude. Actuality presupposes 
possibility, and both Setiya and Kiesewetter have removed Jones’s possibility to 
change his intention in the counterfactual case. So even if both Smith and Jones 
are relevantly equivalent in all other cases, they are not equivalent in the 
counterfactual case.83 Therefore, in the counterfactual case, the relevant rational 
requirements are inapplicable to Jones. So, once again this kind of challenge 
misses its mark against coherence requirements. Moving forward. 
 
2.3: Are Coherence-Based Reasons Right-Kind Reasons? 
 In this section, I will follow Worsnip’s argument for why coherence 
requirements constitute right-kind reasons. Following this overview, I will 
discuss how my amendments in Chapter Three of Worsnip’s account retains the 
right-kind reason distinction. Let us begin.   
 
2.3a: Right-Kind/Wrong-Kind Reasons—A First Pass 
 There is a general idea that a “right-kind” reason is one that is the right 
kind for what it promotes or justifies. For example, having sufficient evidence 
 
83 There is a further problem for Kiesewetter’s version of Setiya’s challenge. For Jones should be 
exempt from rational criticism in the counterfactual case for another reason: the fact that Jones is 
trying to make the rational decision to drop his intention to smoke while a third party improperly 
interferes. It seems misplaced rationally to criticize Jones (who is trying to make the rational 
decision to drop his intention to smoke) while a third party is in fact the one(s) violating the 
coherence requirements (albeit in Jones’s head). We should always evaluate people on what 
they do (or do not do), and in this case, the third party are the ones at fault. Lastly, since the 
example relies on some version of the normative requirement S: {we ought not to smoke}, the 
third party’s action to keep the intention to smoke in play shows them to violate a rational 
requirement.   
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that some proposition p is true is commonly taken to be the “right kind” of 
reason for believing p. For our beliefs should be based on evidence for those 
beliefs. Similarly, a right-kind reason to intend to 𝜙 would be one that 
appropriately (normatively) counts in favor of having the intention to 𝜙. In this 
case, the reason may be moral, prudential, rational, etc.  
 On the other hand, a “wrong-kind” reason is one that promotes 
something but does so in the wrong way (failing to justify that something 
normatively). For example, threats of harm or promises of financial gain would 
be the wrong kind of reason to believe 𝑝. While this kind of reason may be 
motivating, it fails to justify believing 𝑝 normatively. For these considerations in 
no way show the truth of p. Threats of harm and promises of financial gain are 
just not the sort of things that justifies believing 𝑝.84 
 
2.3b: Kolodny’s Challenge 
 Niko Kolodny has claimed that considerations of attitudinal coherence 
cannot be right-kind reasons. As Kolodny writes, when a person rationally 
forms 
 
the belief that p, […] he does so on the grounds of the evidence he 
believes there is, not on the grounds of his recognition that, given 
that he believes that there is conclusive evidence, it would be 
irrational of him not to believe that p. (2005: 547) 
 
Thus, if the fact that rationality requires compliance is a reason to 
comply, it is a reason that we can, and typically do, ignore. In this 
respect, it would be an odd sort of reason. (548). 
 
As Kolodny sees it, our attitudes (in this case a belief) must be justified directly 
by the right-kind substantive reasons (in this case, evidential reasons for 
 
84 Some (including Kolodny [2005] and Kiesewetter [2017: 96-108]) draw the right-kind/wrong-
kind distinction as "object-given" and "state-given" respectively. However, see Schroeder (2012) 
and Worsnip (2020: 25 fn. 66) for reasons against this approach. See also Raz (2009), Heuer 
(2011), and Hieronymi (2013) for alternative formulations of the distinction. Following Worsnip, 
I draw ultimately upon Howard's (2019) framework for right-kind and wrong-kind reasons. 
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believing 𝑝). In this way, Kolodny argues that reasons constituted by coherence 
requirements—reasons to comply with these requirements—could never be 
right-kind reasons. For the right-kind reasons will always be the substantive 
reasons that directly justify our particular attitudes. Coherence-based reasons 
can never directly justify particular attitudes.  
 
2.3c: Worsnip and Right-Kind Reasons for Structural Rationality 
 A useful aspect of Worsnip’s account is that we need not debate Kolodny 
directly on his criticism—we can simply bypass it. For on Worsnip’s account, 
coherence-based reasons are never reasons for particular attitudes—they are 
reasons for coherent deliberation (for coherent structure across attitudes). In 
this way, the original wrong-kind reasons argument against coherence-based 
reasons fails. For as Worsnip puts the point, “while right-kind reasons for belief 
may be exhausted by evidential consideration, this doesn’t mean that right-kind 
reasons for coherent deliberation are exhausted by (or even include) evidential 
considerations” (2020: 25).  
 Borrowing from Christopher Howard (2019), then, we can understand 
the distinction between right-kind and wrong-kind reasons as “fit-related”85 
and “value-related”86 respectively. This distinction has intuitive appeal. It 
makes sense that evidential reasons will be right-kind (fit-related) reasons for 
believing some p since they explain why we ought (or ought not) to believe p 
(based on the evidence). On the other hand, I may find it valuable to intend 
some 𝜙 because doing so will lead to large financial rewards. In this case, the 
promise of financial gain explains why intending to 𝜙 would be good for me.87 
 
85 As Howard writes, a “way in which a fact can count in favor of an attitude is if it explains 
why the attitude would be fitting to its object. For example, the fact that Sharon spends a great 
deal of her time doing charity work is a fact that counts in favor of admiring Sharon, since it’s a 
fact that explains why she’s admirable, and so worthy of—or fit for—admiration” (2019: 218). 
 
86 As Howard writes, a “second way in which a fact can count in favor of an attitude is if it 
explains why the attitude would be somehow valuable or good. For example, the fact that a 
deplorable dictator will order your execution unless you admire him is a fact that counts in 
favor of your admiring the dictator, since it’s a fact that explains why your admiring him would 
be good” (218). 
 
87 Howard’s distinction here resonates with Raz’s (2009) distinction between “standard” and 
“non-standard” reasons. As Heuer comments on Raz’s distinction, standard reasons “relate to 
the inherent standard that governs the forming of the attitude, whereas others [non-standard] 
are provided by the value of having the attitude” (2011: 177). The idea that right-kind reason 
references an internal standard strongly supports the idea of reasons that are “fit-related.” 
 51 
 With this distinction in mind, Worsnip specifies two readings of 
Howard’s conception of fit-related reasons.  
 
Broad Reading if “Fit”: “to say that it’s fitting to 𝜙 is roughly to say that 
it’s correct to 𝜙, given the standards internal to the nature of 𝜙-ing” 
(Worsnip 2020: 25). 
 
Narrow Reading of “Fit”: “some response 𝑅 towards an object 𝑂 is fitting 
just if 𝑂 merits 𝑅” (Ibid. 26). 
 
Under both these understandings of “fit,” coherence-based reasons fit as right-
kind reasons. With the broader reading, it seems natural that attitudinal 
coherence is an internal standard for proper deliberation. This point seems 
natural considering that, when under conditions of full transparency, cases of 
attitudinal incoherence become unintelligible (Chapter One: Section 1.2). 
Further, under the narrow reading, coherence-based reasons also seem to fit. 
For as Worsnip argues, “incoherent combinations merit being treated as off-
limits (in virtue of their incoherence), and that the coherent combinations merit 
our deliberative attention or focus (in virtue of their coherence)” (26). In line 
with Worsnip, I think both readings of “fit” favor coherence-based reasons 
(reasons to structure our deliberations in coherent ways) as right-kind reasons. 
That said, there is now a possible issue that needs addressing.  
 
2.3d: Are Coherence-Based Reasons Action-Oriented Reasons? 
Under the above readings of “fit,” if 𝑂 can be understood as an action, 
then coherence-based reasons can be interpreted as being reasons for action. On 
this point, Worsnip acknowledges that understanding structural “deliberation 
as a ‘mental performance’” further lends to this reading (2020: 26 fn. 68). 
Furthermore, as we will see in Chapter Three, I classify deliberation as a mental 
action. Because of this fact, my account also encourages the interpretation that 
coherence-based reasons are reasons for action. Okay, why worry about this? 
 
Truth is an internal standard for beliefs, and so evidence that p is true constitutes a fit-related 
reason for p.  
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Both Ulrike Heuer (2011) and Pamela Hieronymi (2013) argue that 
reasons for action cannot function under the right-kind reason framework. 
Nevertheless, I believe this challenge can be met. To do so, I will first lay out 
Heuer’s and Hieronymi’s positions on this matter. Following this exposition, I 
will argue why coherence-based reasons retain the right-kind reasons 
classification.  
 
2.3e: Reasons for Action Versus the Right-Kind Framework 
 As I see it, the problem expressed by both Heuer and Hieronymi is that 
the structure involved in following right-kind reasons is fundamentally 
different from action-oriented reasons. Because of this fact, we cannot apply the 
right-kind distinction to reasons for action. Were reasons for action right-kind 
reasons, Hieronymi writes, “we would say the right kind of reason bears on a 
question, the settling of which amounts to acting. But settling a question does 
not amount to acting—it amounts to intending” (2013: 118). In similar stride, 
Heuer claims that the “standard/non-standard [right-kind/wrong-kind] 
reasons distinction is really concerned only with reasons for attitudes” (2011: 
179). And if coherence-based reasons are reasons for attitudes, then we revive 
Kolodny’s challenge that these reasons (if they are reasons at all) cannot be 
right-kind reasons.88 That said, I will now address this “problem.” 
 
2.3f: Coherence-Based Reasons as Right-kind Reasons for Proper Deliberation.  
 The above problem is not really a problem because, under Worsnip’s 
account, coherence-based reasons need not be reasons for action. Instead, they 
should be understood as reasons for meeting a deliberative standard.89 The point 
is this: Reasons to structure our deliberations in coherent ways have no bearing 
on the ends of our deliberations. These reasons are not reasons for what we 
ought to deliberate about. Rather, in keeping with the evaluative nature of 
 
88 Others sharing this position include Broome (2013) and Kiesewetter (2017). However, these 
positions assume that coherence-based reasons must be reasons either for particular attitudes or 
the particular attitudes options within a disjunctive set. In this way, the concerns these positions 
express fail to affect Worsnip’s position because his coherence-based reasons are not for 
particular attitudes, but instead for the coherent structuring of deliberation.  
 
89 On this point, I think Worsnip would be best not to consider coherence-based reasons 
potentially as reasons for “a special kind of action” (2020: 26). Doing so, I think, is unnecessary 
and can lead to the problem being discussed.  
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structure rationality, coherence-based reasons are reasons for deliberating in the 
right way. That said, it is natural to consider coherence-based reasons as right-
kind reasons because they directly reference an internal (constitutive) standard 
of deliberation. Coherence-based reasons are not fitting for this deliberation or 
that deliberation—they are fitting for deliberation, period.  
In this way, coherence-based reasons are not reasons for having an 
intention to deliberate properly. These reasons are reasons for deliberating 
properly about what we choose (for other reasons) to deliberate about. Thus, 
deliberations can be mental actions, and coherence requirements can be right-
kind reasons for meeting the standard of mental action in general. Understood 
this way, I think Worsnip’s coherence-based reasons retain the fitting nature of 
right-kind reasons.90 
 
2.3g: Right-Kind Reasons in an Agency-Constitutivist Framework 
 As a bit of foreshadowing, in the coming chapter I argue for repacking 
Worsnip’s position within a constitutivist account of agency. In doing so, I 
move to justify the normative character of coherence requirements by showing 
that they function as constitutive norms of self-governance. Given this 
framework, we may wonder if coherence-based reasons remain right-kind 
reasons. The short answer is yes.  
The slightly longer answer is this: Worsnip’s coherence-based reasons 
remain “fit-related” with respect to the same constitutive standard internal to 
deliberation. If Worsnip’s coherence requirements are constitutive norms of 
self-governance, then the same internal standard for deliberation (coherent 
deliberation) is also an internal standard for self-governance. I am not arguing 
that coherent deliberation is a separate means used to achieve self-governance. 
 
90 Given that Worsnip’s coherence-based reasons are right-kind reasons, I set aside challenges 
advocating for scenarios wherein we ought, or it is beneficial, to hold incoherent attitude 
combinations (i.e., eccentric billionaires offering money for attitudinal incoherence or evil 
demons threaten harm unless we are attitudinally incoherent, etc.). See Brunero (2020: 131-136) 
and Kavka (1983) for versions of this argument. This challenge relies on value-based reasons, 
and as such, are classic examples of wrong-kind reasons. Furthermore, the structure of these 
cases treats attitudinal incoherence as an action (a means toward and end). Because of this fact, 
as Heuer (2011) and Hieronymi (2013) argue, these reasons (if not wrong-kind reasons) cannot 
be right-kind reasons. Therefore, to what extent these arguments succeed in showing we have a 
reason to be attitudinally incoherent, this reason is not one that threatens the normative status 
of coherence requirements. Taking a page from Kolodny, such reasons “we can, and typically 
do, ignore” (2005: 548). 
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We do not deliberate coherently because we intend to self-govern. Rather, as 
agents, we simply self-govern. Coherent deliberation just is a constitutive part 
of this phenomenon.  
Furthermore, my position in no way relies on valuing self-governance.91 
No. Again, my position is that, as agents, we are always already committed to 
the internal standards of self-governance—it is just what we do. To this end, my 
position rejects any claim that self-governance is an action92 or anything we 
chose to intend.93 In this way, my position also steers clear of the issue Heuer 
(2011) and Hieronymi (2013) express above.  
In this way, I believe that Worsnip’s coherence-based reasons remain 
right-kind reasons for structuring our deliberations in coherent ways. These 
reasons reference the same standard and object as intended by Worsnip. 
Because of this fact, insofar as Worsnip’s reasons succeed as right-kind reasons, 
they remain so under my account.  
 
2.4: Chapter Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, I addressed various challenges leveled against 
normative coherence requirements. As I have argued, coherence requirements 
are able to circumvent bootstrapping scenarios while remaining consistent with 
the intuition that there are right and wrong ways of obtaining attitudinal 
coherence. Following Worsnip, considerations of coherence occupy a proper 
place in our deliberations, working in concert with substantive reasons. Finally, 
I have argued that coherence requirements avoid controversial commitments 
and can be further classified as right-kind reasons.   
 Taken together, this chapter aims to offer a sense of security that 
normative coherence requirements need not entail problematic normative 
outcomes. With that said, there remains the following question: Why ought we 
to adhere to coherence requirements? It is this question I now turn to in the 
following chapter. 
 
91 If so, then coherence-based reasons would be wrong-kind reasons (grounded in our value of 
self-governance).  
 
92 I understand self-governance with respect to actions, but this governing state is separate from 
the action itself. See Chapter Three: Section 3.1. 
 
93 For questions on how my position deals with normative failure, see Chapter Three: Section 
3.3c (Question 2).  
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Chapter Three: Structural Rationality for Self-Governance 
 
3.0: Chapter Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I have relied on a central assumption—that 
coherence requirements are normative. It is time to back up that claim. In doing 
so, I am effectively responding to Kolodny’s (2005) “Why be rational?” 
challenge—that no sufficiently normative explanation can be made for 
complying with coherence requirements of structural rationality in all cases.94 I 
disagree. However, following Worsnip (2020), I do not think that this 
“normative explanation” amounts to having a prior reason to follow coherence 
requirements. For Worsnip argues that coherence requirements are brutely 
normative.95 While I am sympathetic to this position, I find that, as it stands, 
Kolodny’s challenge remains a significant problem for Worsnip’s account. 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to offer a way forward that 
circumvents this problem.  
 My solution is this: rather than offer a prior reason for why we ought to 
follow coherence requirements, we should instead recognize that, as agents, we 
all already commit ourselves to following these requirements. I defend this 
position by arguing that coherence requirements are constitutive norms of self-
governance and that, as agents, we are constitutively committed to being self-
governing. Like Worsnip’s position, I think coherence requirements are brutely 
normative. Unlike Worsnip’s position, I argue that we must understand this 
brute normativity within the larger normative framework of self-governance.  
 I believe that framing Worsnip’s coherence requirements within a 
constitutivist account of agency provides three benefits. First, we are able to 
disarm Kolodny’s challenge by showing it to be unintelligible.96 Second, when 
rejecting Kolodny’s position, we can do so in a way that explains why self-
 
94 “I have tried to examine those [reasons] that seem initially most promising. The inadequacy of 
some of these proposals, and the implausibility of others, is at least some further ground, in 
addition to the bootstrapping problem, to doubt that we have reasons to comply with rational 
requirements” (Kolodny 2005: 547). 
 
95 Worsnip’s terms these requirements as “non-derivatively” normative in the sense that they 
constitute reasons to structure our attitudes in coherent ways (2020: 7). In this way, reasons flow 
from these requirements rather than the requirements themselves being justified by a prior 
reason.  
 
96 Worsnip (2020) also makes this claim. However, in sections 3.3c-3.3d, I argue why I think 
Worsnip’s strategy is problematic.  
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governance is brutely normative in a definitive sense.97 Third, as an entailment 
of the second point, we can also explain why coherence requirements are 
normative for the kind of creatures that we are (agents).98  
 That said, this chapter unfolds as follows. As preliminaries to my 
argument, (in section 3.1) I lay out what I mean by self-governance, agency, and 
action. Next, (in section 3.2) I discuss two ways in which coherence 
requirements could be normative. In doing so, I raise a dilemma and propose 
repackaging coherence requirements under an agency-constitutivist framework 
as a way forward. From here, (in section 3.3) I argue that complying with 
coherence requirements is constitutive of our self-governance. Finally, (in 
section 3.4) I argue that we should take our self-governance as primitively 
(brutely) normative. In doing so, coherence requirements (as a constitutive 
aspect of our self-governance) are normative as well. Let us begin. 
 
3.1: Self-Governance, Proper Descriptions, and Authored Action  
The purpose of this section is to introduce key concepts I will use in the 
following discussion. I will specify my understanding of self-governance as 
well as agents and action. In the subsequent sections following these 
preliminaries, I believe the argument for coherence requirement compliance 
falls out naturally as a necessary condition for self-governance.  
 
3.1a: Agents as Potential Self-Governors.  
Very broadly, I understand agents to be potentially self-governing 
creatures. Following Connie Rosati, an agent is a creature “capable of engaging 
in practical and theoretical reasoning and capable of self-governance on the 
basis of its reasoning” (2016: 194). That said, I understand self-governance to be 
state wherein, as agents, we choose our actions for reasons and impose some 
rational structure over our actions in order to govern them as they unfold. That 
 
97 What I mean is that Worsnip’s (2020) coherence-based reasons to structure our deliberations 
coherently can be understood as definitive, or all-things-considered, reasons. This claim is in 
opposition to Bratman’s position where self-governance-based attitudinal coherence remains 
conditional on our desire to live our lives (2009: 432, fn. 60).  
 
98 This point refers to criticisms of the kind that Schroeder raises against wide-scope accounts of 
coherence requirements—that the unconditionality of these requirements leaves why these 
requirements apply to us a mystery (2004: 349).  
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said, I also take self-governance to be directional in the following way: Self-
governance is always self-governance with respect to some action 𝜙. Therefore, 
insofar as we rationally determine and govern our actions, we are manifesting 
our self-governance. Given this account of agency and self-governance, I now 
need to clarify what I mean by actions.  
 
3.1b: Self-Governance and Action 
When I embarked on this particular dissertation, I did so because I chose 
to. Furthermore, building this dissertation is something that I did, not anyone 
else. The events that collectively add up to this dissertation were dependent on 
me non-accidentally bringing them into being. Said differently, building this 
dissertation is my action insofar as I authored it under my own volition.99  
Along these lines, I very broadly define an action as an event (or events) 
understood under a unified description that is caused and carried out by an 
agent. That said, an action is self-governed when the agent causing and carrying 
out the action chooses (for some reason) to act and rationally directs the action 
as it unfolds. In this way, an action is my action when I am self-governing with 
respect to that action—it is something authored by me.  
Furthermore, since we commonly attribute actions to an agent by 
pointing to the agent’s corresponding attitudes, I will say that self-governance 
partially involves the governance of one’s action-related attitudes. I govern over 
my action 𝜙 (am self-governing with respect to 𝜙) insofar as I choose to 𝜙 and 
rationally direct my 𝜙-related attitudes. 
Finally, I understand action broadly, as both physical and mental events. 
Insofar as my mental events are purposeful—oriented toward an end or goal—
 
99 I am granting that agents have the capacity to choose what they do of their own volition. 
Admittedly, there are entire subfields of philosophy dedicated to the metaphysics of how, or 
even if, such volition is truly possible. While I agree that such inquiries are undoubtedly 
important, I believe these discussions take us too far outside the scope of my dissertation. For 
my work concerns whether we ought to follow coherence requirements. However, if one day we 
learn that “ought” is in no way distinct from “is,” that what I ought to do is in fact reducible to 
what I will do, then there may not be much for ethics and metaethics to say outside of applying 
physics, neural biochemistry, etc. to our first person perspectives.  In this case, I will not need to 
wonder what I ought to do. For any answer would seem rather meaningless against the 
inevitability of what, deterministically, I will do. Therefore, for the purposes of my dissertation, 
I grant agents the ability to choose what they do meaningfully. For any conversation over what 
reasons or requirements we ought to follow presupposes the ability for us to make a 
meaningful choice between live options.  
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these mental events are my actions as well. If I am thinking about 𝑋 in service of 
my end 𝐸, then my thinking of 𝑋 is my action. For I am deliberating about 𝑋 in 
service to some goal I have chosen. Whether I am purposefully moving my 
hands or solving a math problem in my head, these are both actions.100 I am 
causing, and rationally directing, some event to occur in service of what I have 
chosen to achieve.101 In this way, I treat internal (mental) actions on par with 
external (physical) actions. Under my account, then, actions are those events 
that agents—when self-governing—purposefully cause and rationally direct. 
Now, in the discussion so far, I have been implicitly relying on a concept that 
will become more important as this chapter unfolds. I will discuss this concept 
now.  
 
3.1c: Proper Descriptions as Constitutive Standards  
Say that I am making a cup of coffee. Making this coffee is my action, 
and I am self-governing with respect to this action as its author. In order to talk 
this way, I, and others observing me, need to be able to identify similarly what I 
am doing as making coffee. If I am skydiving, and there is no water within my 
reach, chances are that I am not making coffee. So there needs to be some 
external standard of “coffee-making” to point to for reference. More generally 
put, we need a way of identifying and distinguishing particular actions as they 
are authored (self-governed) by agents.  
In order to do this, I propose using what Jeremy Fix calls “proper 
descriptions.” As Fix writes,  
 
An exercise of a capacity is by nature subject to a normative 
principle in that the nature of the capacity determines the content 
of that principle. [...] An account of the nature of a capacity, then, 
is just an account of the nature of the activity in question. In my 
terminology, for each capacity there is a principle that describes 
 
100 There is a potential criticism here: By allowing certain mental events to be actions, we may 
look to Heuer’s (2011) and Hieronymi’s (2013) analyses to argue that the reasons for these 
(mental) actions cannot be the “right kind” of reasons. I have attended to this potential criticism 
in Chapter Two: Section 2.3. 
 




its nature whose content is identical to the proper description of a 
certain activity. And that principle is normative for exercises of 
that capacity. (2020: 37, italics added).  
 
As I understand it, a proper description is a constitutive standard that allows us 
to judge that and how well we are doing something. I take “proper” to mean 
ideal, that is, a description of the ideal instantiation of some action or activity. 
Now, in terms of the normative character of these proper descriptions, a few 
caveats are needed. First, I am not saying that, given the proper description of 
some 𝜙, we ought to 𝜙.102 When we judge how well people dance or build 
chairs, these judgments are not concerned with the motivations for, and 
permissibility of, dancing or chair building—the why and should of it. Rather, 
we are merely judging that and how well people perform these actions. That 
said, the normative character involved in proper descriptions must be 
conditional on our reasons to perform the corresponding action. If we are 𝜙-ing, 
then we are subject to the standard of 𝜙-ing.103 In turn, we are released from the 
standard of 𝜙-ing when we no longer have a reason to 𝜙 (or a reason against 𝜙-
ing). With that said, let us return to idea of self-governance as authorship.  
 
3.1d: Action and Proper Descriptions 
We now have a clearer sense of what it means to author an action. I am 
authoring the action of making the cup of coffee when making that coffee is the 
object of my self-governance. However, in order for this relation between 
author and action to hold, I must direct my attitudes to correspond to the 
events we describe as my action. And in order to do this, the content and 
structure of my directed attitudes must correspond to the proper description of 
coffee-making. Otherwise, we cannot say that I am making coffee. That said, 
self-governing with respect to 𝜙—understanding 𝜙-ing as my action—relies on 
 
102 This would be absurd as it would entail that we ought to perform every possible action, take 
part in every possible activity.  
 
103 There is one exception to this conditionality, one proper description that is not conditional, 
that I will discuss in Section 3.4b). 
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the proper description of 𝜙-ing as the constitutive standard determining that 
my attitudes correspond to 𝜙-ing.  
Taken together, the above offers a brief articulation of the terms and 
concepts I will use in the following argument. As agents, when we self-govern, 
we do so in terms of our actions. In turn, these actions—defined under proper 
descriptions—manifest our self-governance.  
 
3.2: Coherence Requirements and Normative Reason-Relations 
 The purpose of this section is to explore how coherence requirements 
could be understood within a reasons-based conception of normative 
rationality. Under this framework, the general consensus is that any set of 
requirements 𝑆 is normative only if 𝑆 has a direct relation to the presence of 
reasons. Following Worsnip, we naturally “cash out” normativity “in terms of 
the notion of a reason” (2020: 2). Similarly, as Connie Rosati points out, we 
“tend to understand normativity in terms of reasons” (2016: 205).  
 That said, my argument proceeds in the following way. Following 
Worsnip’s work (in section 3.2a) I discuss two versions of ordering a relation 
between normative requirements and reasons. In doing so, I discuss a dilemma 
I find between the versions. Next, (in section 3.2b) I survey Worsnip’s position 
on this dilemma. Moving forward, (in section 3.2c) I point out a problem for 
Worsnip’s account and (in section 3.2d) discuss possible responses internal to 
Worsnip’s position. Finally, (in section 3.2e) I briefly introduce an alternative 
way forward for understanding the normativity of coherence requirements. 
This alternative understanding will comprise the remaining sections of this 
chapter. 
   
3.2a: Reason-Relations—Derivative and Non-Derivative 
 Reason-based normativity implies that there exists a relation between 
normative requirements and reasons.104 Now, given that I am working to 
 
104 Here I must acknowledge a limitation of my argument. I will not address particularist 
accounts of reasons such as Dancy’s (2004) position and others. Addressing particularist 
positions would involve a much larger dissertation, taking us too far afield from the subject at 
hand. That said, I leave this oversight intentionally as a potential limitation for my view. That 
said, please see McKeever and Ridge (2006) for a reply to particularism in ethics.  
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defend wide-scope coherence requirements,105 my discussion of this reason-
relation will be limited to those applicable to unconditional rational 
requirements. Following Worsnip, this relation orders reasons and 
requirements in two ways:  
 
Derivative Reason-Relation (𝐷𝑅𝑅): There exists at least one reason 𝑅, 
corresponding to some fact 𝐹, for any agent 𝐴 to comply with 𝑆.  
 
Non-Derivative Reason-Relation (𝑁𝐷𝑅𝑅): Facts about what 𝑆 
requires of some agent 𝐴 constitutes a reason 𝑅 for 𝐴 to have an 
appropriately related response 𝜃.106 
 
Under 𝐷𝑅𝑅, reasons are ordered prior to, as justifications of, the normative 
authority of 𝑆.107 In this way, these prior reasons normatively explain why we 
ought to follow 𝑆. Nevertheless, these prior reasons themselves are left 
unexplained. Alternatively, 𝑁𝐷𝑅𝑅 reverses the reason-relation such that 𝑆, now 
non-derivatively (foundationally) normative, constitutes reasons.108 In this case, 
𝑆 is normatively “explained” by the fact that 𝑆 constitutes reasons.109 However, 
 
105 Recall my dismissal of the narrow-scope approach for coherence requirements (Chapter Two: 
Section 2.2). 
106 See Worsnip (2020: 2-7) for the original formulations. Worsnip does consider a third version 
of the reason-relation but dismisses it as being too weak to supply a useful account of 
normative rationality. As Worsnip writes, this approach allows that “our having reasons for 
these [rational] responses may have absolutely nothing to do with the fact that they are 
rationally required. This doesn’t seem like it would be a vindication of the normativity of 
rationality in any interesting sense” (6). Given the problems this third option incurs, I have 
chosen to omit it as a viable alternative. 
 
107 When we say you ought to follow societal laws because doing so maintains social order, we 
are giving a prior normative reason 𝑅 to comply with 𝑆 (societal laws), where 𝑅 corresponds to 
the fact F (following the law maintains social order). So, if we say that there is a reason to follow 
coherence requirements, then we are understanding coherence standards as derivatively 
normative. We are looking outside of coherence standards to “find some external goal that they 
serve” (Worsnip 2020: 4).  
 
108 See Prichard (1912) for a canonical case or moral requirements being non-derivatively 
normative.  
 
109 My argument is running under a framework where reasons are explained by requirements. 
That said, I will also consider (or “repackage”) constitutivist positions on reasons in terms of 
𝑁𝐷𝑅𝑅. By constitutivist positions, I mean any position that explains reasons definitionally in 
terms of their function. Schroeder’s (2005: 16-20, 2007: 212-217) position is one such example. 
For Schroeder, what it is to be a reason is to be a consideration that explains why 𝜙-ing would 
promote my desires (2007: 217). Now, while the subjective/agent-relative nature of Schroeder’s 
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this approach remains silent on justifying why 𝑆 constitutes reasons—i.e., this 
approach rejects the question: Why is 𝑆 normative?110 Now, I agree with 
Worsnip that both orderings of the normative reason-relation meet the criteria 
for reason-based normativity. Both orderings offer agents reasons that make the 
content of the requirements guiding.  
Nevertheless, there is a problem: 𝐷𝑅𝑅 requirements alone entail a regress 
problem, but 𝑁𝐷𝑅𝑅 requirements leave normativity ultimately unexplained. If 
𝑆 is derivatively normative, its normative status is easily explainable by an 
external fact 𝐹 generating a reason 𝑅 to follow 𝑆. However, this approach leads 
to a regress issue unless 𝑆 is grounded somewhere by a further 𝑁𝐷𝑅𝑅 
requirement (or constitutive standard).111 So, it seems that, even if some 
requirements are derivatively normative, all requirements cannot be. 
Alternatively, if 𝑆 is non-derivatively normative, we avoid the regress issue 
(since there is no talk of prior reasons). However, in this case the normative 
justification of 𝑆 is left unexplained112—somehow 𝑆 just is normative. So, we 
either incur a regress or accept that some requirements are brutely normative, 
leaving the normativity of those requirements unexplained (or at least 




reasons are inappropriate for discussing wide-scope rational requirements (see Chapter Two: 
Section 2.2a), any constitutivist position offering objective/agent-neutral reasons is fair game. 
That said, in the case of objective reasons, I think the difference (significant to my argument at 
least) between 𝑁𝐷𝑅𝑅 requirements and constitutive standards is merely verbal.  
 
110 See Kolodny (2005, 2007) and Raz (2005) for canonical challenges to normative requirements 
by posing such questions. My position seeks to give an answer to this question.  
 
111 Since, under my framework, why 𝐹 generates 𝑅 must be explained by a more fundamental 
normative requirement also needing a prior reason, etc. Again, this point follows because I am 
classifying constitutivist accounts of reasons under 𝑁𝐷𝑅𝑅 requirements (See fn. 109 above). 
When I refer to a 𝐷𝑅𝑅 requirement, I am following Worsnip (at least as I read him) on the point 
that this requirement presupposes a further normative structure. In terms of epistemic cases, 
Worsnip writes, “someone could hold that evidential considerations constitute reasons for 
belief only in virtue of such a further, general reason (such as the fact that evidential supported 
beliefs are more likely to be true). But such a person would, ipso facto, not count as thinking 
that evidence is non-derivatively normatively significant: she would be treating truth, not 
evidence, as fundamental” (2020: 5). The point here is that, as I am using the idea of 𝐷𝑅𝑅 
requirements, they alone cannot ground normative explanations. 
 
112 Since there is the outstanding question of why facts about S constitute reasons, the “Why is 𝑆 
normative?”, or “Why ought we to follow 𝑆?”, question remains.  
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3.2b: Worsnip and Non-Derivative Normativity 
Now, Worsnip opts for the non-derivative reason relation in order to 
argue for the normativity of coherence requirements. I understand Worsnip’s 
motivations for this to be twofold. First, Worsnip recognizes that any 
explanation of normativity must avoid a regress. That said, we must hold some 
requirement 𝑆 as brutely normative. When faced with the question, “What 
reason do we have to comply with 𝑆?”, we “should refuse to try to answer that 
question” (Worsnip 2020: 5). As Worsnip writes, on “pain of regress, eventually 
you must reach something that you take to be non-derivatively normatively 
significant” (6).  
Second, following H. A. Pritchard’s (1912) lead, Worsnip seems to claim 
that, in order to argue that coherence requirements are “fully” normative, and 
not parasitic on some other normative structure, we need to keep the 
normativity of coherence requirements “in house” so-to-speak. Since coherence 
requirements are understood as requirements of rationality, Worsnip seeks to 
defend the normativity of these requirements within the domain of rationality 
(4-8, especially 6). I do think Worsnip is correct that, in arguing for the 
normativity of coherence requirements, we must avoid a regress of normative 
requirements and reasons. The buck has to stop somewhere.  
 
3.2c: A Problem for Worsnip’s Account 
Nevertheless, I find Worsnip’s approach problematic. For I do not think 
we can reject the question, “Why comply with coherence requirements?” in the 
way Worsnip suggests. Granted, there is something paradoxical in being asked 
to justify the normativity of coherence requirements with a reason external to 
rationality.113 Nevertheless, we should be able to say something about why the 
normativity of these particular requirements should be understood non-
derivatively. Asked more generally: when choosing between normative 
requirements 𝑆!, 𝑆", 𝑆', etc., why choose 𝑆! rather than 𝑆" or 𝑆' to be non-
derivative?114  
 
113 There is a nonparadoxical form of this question for Worsnip’s account, which I will discuss 
shortly. 
 
114 Consider debates in ethics and metaethics: If we are allowed to ignore the “Why?” (or the 
“Why this rather than that?”) question, what do the Humeans, Kantians, and Substantive Moral 
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These questions foreshadow Rosati’s insight that our understanding of 
normativity remains incomplete if we cannot account for how our normative 
judgments about our normative requirements hold. Rosati writes, 
 
I take it to be a desideratum on analyses of normative properties 
that they make it explicable why these inferential relations would 
hold among judgments about those properties. We might say that 
an account of normative properties captures their normativity 
when it makes the ordinary inferential relations among our 
normative judgments (our judgments about these properties) 
explicable. (2016: 209)115 
 
It no longer remains reasonable simply to reject the question: Why comply with 
coherence requirements? For now, as long as we reject this question, we 
undermine these requirements by making their justification (at least partially) 
inexplicable.116 Now, I imagine Worsnip could respond in one of three ways. 
 
3.2d: Possible Responses from Worsnip 
First, Worsnip could try to argue that, treating coherence requirements 
as anything other than non-derivatively normative, makes these requirements 
problematically weak. However, I think this response would be tenuous at best. 
For Worsnip himself acknowledges that “views on which rationality is 
derivatively normatively significant are still views on which rationality is 
normative in some good sense” (2020: 6). As long as the reasons and oughts 
associated with coherence requirements are both “all-things-considered” and 
 
Realists have left to talk about? As long as each side can reasonably say that their set of 
requirements 𝑆 gives us reasons, there seems little left to discuss as to which approach is the 
correct one. Worsnip acknowledges that different positions take on different requirements as 
non-derivatively normative (2020: 4-6). Nevertheless, I do not see that he offers a solution for 
this difficulty. 
 
115 On this same point, Schroeder argues that a problem for wide-scope accounts of coherence 
requirements is that why these requirements apply to us remains unexplained (2004: 349).  
 
116 Rosati further writes, “Non-naturalism [in ethics] might seem to meet this condition. After 
all, ethical properties can be analyzed in terms of the ethical property that is unanalyzable and 
brutely normative, and this would seem to be enough to explain the holding of inferential 
relations. But this leaves the normativity of the basic ethical property utterly mysterious, and in 
that respect, the explanation of the holding of these inferential relations is incomplete” (2016: 
209-210).  
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occurring in all rationally governable contexts, these requirements will be 
strong enough.  
Second, Worsnip could respond by arguing that Rosati’s requirement of 
normative explicability is unobtainable. For, in order to meet Rosati’s 
requirement, we would need to answer what Worsnip claims is an “inherently 
nonsensical or confused” question: What reason do we have to comply with 
coherence requirements? (5). It is a question that has no informative answer. 
However, as far as I understand it, Worsnip’s account of normative coherence 
requirements actually allows a sensical form of this question. For Worsnip 
treats coherence requirements as requirements of structural rationality, not 
rationality in general. It seems then that we can ask the question: what 
substantive reason do we have for complying with coherence requirements? 
Now, the reason we’re looking for lies within the domain of reasons, but 
outside the domain of structural rationality. 
Third, Worsnip could try to claim that the reasons constituted by 
coherence requirements somehow justify the non-derivative reason-relation. I 
think this response fails as well. Either this justification is problematically 
circular (that the reasons coherence requirements give us somehow justify the 
requirements in the first place), or these reasons point to a further purpose 
(making coherence requirements derivatively normative). With the latter, I am 
thinking of Worsnip’s claim that coherence requirements give us reasons to 
structure our deliberations in coherent ways (20-24). Now, I agree with Worsnip 
that coherence requirements should give us reasons to structure our 
deliberations in coherent ways. However, these reasons cannot be Worsnip’s 
explanation for why we ought to follow coherence requirements—for doing so 
would seem to make these requirements derivatively normative as a means 




117 That said, I do not think it is Worsnip’s intent to use these reasons to justify coherence 
requirements under the non-derivative reason relation. Rather, here Worsnip is responding to 
Kolodny’s (2005: 547-8) challenge that there is no essential function in our deliberations for 
reasons to structure our attitudes coherently. To this end, Worsnip (2020: 16-24) is offering 
significant progress toward vindicating normative coherence requirements. The point I am 
making is that this approach would not be successful in meeting Rosati’s challenge of 
normative explicability.  
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3.2e: A Way Forward 
I believe the problem raised is a significant one for Worsnip’s defense of 
normative coherence requirements. Now, I do think Worsnip (2020) is correct 
that 𝑁𝐷𝑅𝑅 meets the criteria for placing 𝑆 within a reason-based conception of 
normativity. And Worsnip is also right to be wary that questions of the form, 
“Why is 𝑆 normative?”, invite derivatively normative responses (leading to 
potential regress problems). Nevertheless, Rosati’s point still needs addressing.  
As I see it, there are two ways going forward. The first option is to argue 
for coherence requirements under 𝐷𝑅𝑅. This approach makes these 
requirements derivatively normative—i.e., in service of some further non-
derivatively normative structure. The second option is to argue for coherence 
requirements under 𝑁𝐷𝑅𝑅, like Worsnip does, but in a way that meets Rosati’s 
challenge of normative explicability. I opt for this second option. I argue that, once 
understood as constitutive norms of self-governance, coherence requirements 
function as part of the larger non-derivatively normative structure of self-
governance. 
That said, my task going forward is twofold. First, I need to show why 
coherence requirements should be understood as constitutive norms of self-
governance. And second, I need to argue that self-governance functions under 
𝑁𝐷𝑅𝑅 as a non-derivatively normative structure—one that meets Rosati’s 
challenge of normative explicability. To commence: 
 
3.3: The Necessity of Attitudinal Coherence for Self-Governance 
 In this section I aim to show that coherence requirements are constitutive 
norms of self-governance. To do so, I will argue that complying with these 
requirements is a necessary condition of self-governance. While Bratman (2009) 
argues for a similar position, I find his argument problematic in various ways. 
That said, in the spirit of Bratman’s project, I offer a new way to show the 
necessity of attitude coherence for self-governance. To begin, (in section 3.3a) I 
briefly introduce Bratman’s position and discuss a challenge raised by 
Kiesewetter (2017). Next, (in section 3.3b) I offer an alternative argument for 
why complying with coherence requirements is a necessary condition for our 
self-governance. Moving forward, (in section 3.3c) I clarify my position by 
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responding to three potential questions. Finally, (in section 3.3d) I discuss how 
my position moves past Kiesewetter’s criticism of Bratman. In doing so, I hope 
to offer a compelling argument for understanding coherence requirements as 
constitutive norms of self-governance. 
 
3.3a: Attitudinal Coherence as Where We Stand on Issues 
 
Bratman’s Account 
 Bratman argues that, in order to be self-governing, our attitudes must 
represent where we stand on issues. As Bratman writes, we need a way for “an 
agent to identify with a certain thought or attitude—of what it is for a thought 
or attitude to speak for the agent, to be part of where the agent stands” 
(Bratman 2009: 430). Consider an akratic case. Say we are considering whether 
or not to join a protest march. We judge we ought to join the protest, but we 
lack the intention to do so. In this case, Bratman would say that our attitudinal 
incoherence shows that we remain undecided on where we stand about joining 
the protest (431). Until we either revise our judgment or follow through with 
the corresponding intention, we lack “the kind of unity of stance needed for 
there to be a clear answer” as to how we will guide ourselves (431). In this way, 
Bratman attests that holding coherent attitude combinations is necessary for 
self-governance.118 
 
A Problem for Bratman’s Account 
Bratman’s argument has an intuitive appeal to it. Since our attitudes 
correspond to our actions, it seems reasonable that our attitudes should 
represent where we stand on issues we engage with. Nevertheless, by 
connecting our determinations of where we stand on issues to our compliance 
with coherence requirements, Kiesewetter raises a challenge for Bratman. 
Kiesewetter argues that a necessary entailment of Bratman’s view is that we 
have a reason to determine where we stand on all possible issues—something 
heavily overdemanding (if not impossible). 
 




The purpose of Bratman’s position is to defend the normativity of wide-
scope coherence requirements by arguing that we have a reason 𝑅 that 
vindicates these requirements. That said, in order to vindicate coherence 
requirements, R must exist throughout the domain of coherence requirements—
i.e., in all possible contexts where structurally rational criticism is possible.119 
Now, here is the rub according to Kiesewetter.  
The problem is that Bratman’s reason 𝑅 to comply with coherence 
requirements transmits from this reason 𝑅$ to determine rationally where we 
stand on issues.120 Because of this fact, 𝑅$ stands in an injective relation to 𝑅.121 
We have 𝑅 insofar as we have 𝑅$. Given this transmission relation, if 𝑅 is to 
vindicate the normativity of coherence requirements, 𝑅$ must exist at least in all 
possible contexts within the domain of coherence requirements. And this fact 
entails that we have a reason 𝑅$ to determine where we stand on all possible 
issues where structurally rational criticism is possible. Illustrating this problem, 
Kiesewetter writes,  
 
Consider the case of withholding belief with respect to a certain 
issue. Withholding belief with respect to p means that one has not 
determined where one stands with respect to a certain domain in 
which rational requirements apply. But this is often the most 
rational response we can give, and it seems just false to say that 
we always have a reason to settle the matter whether to believe  
p or ¬p for any proposition p (consider “the number of stars is 
equal”). (2017: 106)122 
 
119 This point follows because wide-scope coherence requirements are unconditional 
requirements. 
 
120 Ultimately, the reason to comply with coherence requirements traces from self-governance to 
a need to determine rationally where we stand on issues to following coherence requirements. 
Nevertheless, the problem is that the transmission of this reason passes through our rational 
determinations over where we stand on issues. 
 
121 Otherwise, there are cases where Bratman’s defense of coherence requirement normativity 
fails.  
 
122 Kiesewetter extends his criticism in the following way: “A similar point applies to intentions. 
It seems clear that we do not have a reason to determine our stance with respect to intending an 
action for each possible action. But if having determined where one stands in a given domain 
counts as a prerequisite for governing oneself in that domain, it would follow that a reason to 
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Not only does it seem unintuitive that we have a reason to determine where we 
stand on all possible issues; having this reason is seriously overdemanding! 
With the former, it seems problematic to say that we have a reason to determine 
where we stand on issues in cases where, due to the available evidence, the 
most substantively rational course of action is to withhold judgment about a 
belief or intention. With the latter, determining where we stand on all possible 
issues is just too demanding (if not impossible) for agents like us. Now, one 
response might be to claim that our reason to determine where we stand on 
issues is overridable (or pro tanto).123 However, if this strategy solves 
Kiesewetter’s issue, it does so by invalidating the normative status of coherence 
requirements themselves (or at least in the robust sense in which I think these 
requirements are defendable). Since, if our reason 𝑅 to follow coherence 
requirements transmits from our reason 𝑅$ to determine where we stand on all 
issues, then whenever 𝑅$ is overridable, so is 𝑅. Therefore, this strategy entails 
the existence of cases where holding coherent attitude combinations would not 
be the most rational thing to do.124 
I think we must do better; we must show why, in all cases, we are 
definitively committed (in an all-things-considered way) to following coherence 
requirements.125 In order to amend Bratman’s argument, then, I have three tasks 
before me. First, I must show that we can be self-governing in cases where we 
abstain on some issue (withholding belief, decision, etc.). Second, I must offer 
 
govern oneself in each domain does indeed give rise to a reason to determine for each possible 
action whether to intend it or not” (2017: 106).  
 
123 See Broome (2004) for a full discussion on pro tanto reasons.  
 
124 If so, then in such cases there would be an overriding reason for attitudinal incoherence. See 
Chapter Two: Section 2.3 (end of section) for my rebuttal. As an additional point, we should 
recognize that cases where we have reasons to forgo our self-governance (needing to sleep at a 
certain time, agreeing to be put under anesthesia for medical reasons, etc.) do not entail that the 
reasons self-governance transmits to coherence requirement compliance are pro tanto. First, 
because we could say that our reason to forgo self-governance in these cases favors maintaining 
our self-governance later or in the long run (i.e., resting to work later, medical treatment to 
carry on afterward, etc.). So, we need not say there is a reason outweighing our self-governance. 
Second, (following “ought implies can”) the presence of self-governance is a necessary 
condition for normative requirements—i.e., the only cases where reasons will apply are those 
where self-governance is present. This point applies to cases of suicide as well. For if self-
governance necessarily requires attitudinal coherence, choosing to commit suicide will also 
require this same coherence.  
 
125 Furthermore, even if Bratman’s argument could resist Kiesewetter’s criticism, Bratman’s 
position makes coherence requirement normativity conditional on our desire to be self-
governing (2009: 432, fn. 60). Coherence requirements need a stronger normative foundation.  
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an alternative argument that (1) constitutively links coherence-requirement 
compliance to self-governance and (2) avoids the issue of abstention. And third, 
I must show how my position avoids Kiesewetter’s criticism.  
I will now attend to each issue in turn. The first two tasks I will deal with 
in section 3.3b. Afterward, in section 3.3c, I will clarify my argument in three 
ways. Finally, in section 3.3d, I will defend my position against Kieswetter’s 
criticism.  
 
3.3b: My Argument—Attitude Coherence as the Intelligibility of Actions 
I agree with Kiesewetter that there will be cases where the most rational 
thing to do is to withhold belief or judgment. Nevertheless, I do not think these 
cases preclude our self-governance. Furthermore, I maintain that our self-
governance still requires that we structure our deliberations in coherent ways. I 
will now argue both these points in turn.  
 
Self-Governance without Determining Where We Stand 
I think we can reasonably say that it is possible to be self-governing in 
cases where we abstain with regard to issues. Recall Kiesewetter’s example 
using the proposition about stars. Say I am asked: Is the number of stars even? 
When asked, I realize that I lack the sufficient evidence to answer the question, 
and so I decide to withhold my belief on the matter. Even without specifying 
the minimal conditions of self-governance,126 I think it is reasonable to say that 
my determination to withhold my belief in this case can be described as my 
self-governed action as an agent. I chose to engage with the question, 
determined the necessary evidence for belief was lacking, and because of this 
fact decided to withhold my belief on the matter.127 
Furthermore, similar arguments can be run for any case where our 
rational engagement with some issue leads to our abstention on that issue. For 
example, say that I cannot decide whether to have apple or cherry pie. It seems 
 
126 What the minimal conditions of self-governance are remains an open question. See Buss and 
Westlund (2018) for an overview. Because of this fact, my argument argues for a necessary 
condition—that I structure my deliberation in coherent ways.  
 
127 This case seems fine as an instance of self-governance. For if not, then we are saying that we 
can only be self-governing when we believe we have “gotten to the bottom of things,” when we 
believe we have definitive answers. I think this is far too strong a condition for being self-
governing.  
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overdemanding to say that my indecision here violates my self-governance 
with regard to this issue. For, I can simply decide not to have pie at all. As long 
we have a reasoned process between our engagement with some issue and our 
decision to abstain on that issue, we can describe this reasoned process as our 
self-governed action. 
Now, there is an important caveat here. There will be cases where we 
must either determine where we stand or abstain in a way that decides for us. 
With the former, think of cases akin to driving towards a fork in the road. 
Assuming I do not turn around, I will have to decide whether to go right or left. 
With the abstention case, recall the protest march example. If I am deliberating 
on whether or not to attend the march, and I choose to abstain on the issue, in 
reality it seems that (whether or not I want to frame the situation this way) I 
have decided not to attend the protest.  
In this way, I do not think that finessing Bratman’s argument to account 
for our abstention on issues avoids Kiesewetter’s challenge.128 However, this 
amendment is a step in the right direction for making Bratman’s position more 
palatable. That said, I propose the following argument for showing the 
necessary connection between self-governance and complying with coherence 
requirements.  
 
Self-Governance and Action Intelligibility 
 Let us start with an uncontroversial premise: If I am self-governing over 
my action 𝜙, it must be at least the case that I am 𝜙-ing. Otherwise, I lose the 
object of my self-governance. So far, so good. However, I now claim that, in 
order to determine that I am the one who is 𝜙-ing, it is necessary that I structure 
my 𝜙-related attitudes in a coherent way.129 
This point is what I now will argue. That said, as a disclaimer, I want to 
acknowledge first that my argument runs at a very “course-grained” level, 
meaning that I intentionally state the argument without attending to every fine-
 
128 Restricting the wide-scope coherence requirement domain will be how we ultimately avoid 
Kiesewetter’s conclusion for Bratman’s position. To be discussed in section 3.3d. 
 
129 Doing so removes scenarios where my 𝜙-related attitudes are jointly coherent, but I am not 
self-governing (i.e., my desire or some compulsion takes over, a mad scientist or evil demon 
remote-controls me, etc.).  
 
 72 
grained nuance along the way. I chose this initial presentation for brevity’s 
sake—to get the idea on the table first—in order to discuss the details further. 
That said, my argument formally runs as follows: 
 
1. I self-govern insofar as I govern my actions.130 
2. I do not govern any specific	action	𝜙 if I do not choose to 𝜙 and direct my 
𝜙-ing. 
3. I do not direct my 𝜙-ing if I do not direct my 𝜙-related attitudes to 
correspond to a proper description of 𝜙-ing. 
4. I do not direct my 𝜙-related attitudes to correspond to a proper 
description of 𝜙-ing if I do not structure my 𝜙-related attitudes in an 
intelligible way. 
5. I do not structure my 𝜙-related attitudes in an intelligible way if I do not 
structure my 𝜙-related attitudes in a jointly coherent way. 
6. Therefore, (by 1-5) I do not self-govern over my 𝜙-ing unless I structure 
my 𝜙-related attitudes in a jointly coherent way. 
 
Being attitudinally coherent in and of itself does not guarantee my self-
governance. For example, my attitudes might jointly cohere by accident while I 
sleep, or a mad scientist may coherently structure my attitudes remotely, etc. 
Nevertheless, without it being the case that I am the one directing this attitudinal 
coherence with respect to 𝜙—I cannot be self-governing with respect to 𝜙-ing. 
In this way, complying with coherence requirements functions as a necessary 
condition of my self-governance. Given this argument, I will now expand on 
the steps in more detail.  
 
Action Explanation 
Let us start with a common idea. When I act, I do so for a reason, and 
this reason explains my action. Now, this explanation is important for 
understanding me as self-governing because it shows that I chose to 𝜙. I am 𝜙-
 
130 With respect to the question of where we stand on some issue 𝑋, 𝜙 can either be (1) an action 
referencing a determination about 𝑋 or (2) an action referencing an abstention from 𝑋.  
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ing because of 𝑅. Nevertheless, 𝑅 cannot function as the entire explanation of 
my action. For 𝑅 explains only the impetus for my action—the why of it. 𝑅 does 
not explain how I 𝜙 or that I am 𝜙-ing. Let us focus on the latter—that I am 𝜙-
ing.  
When I am self-governing with respect to 𝜙, it must be the case that I am 
(directly or indirectly) causing and directing the events that constitute my 𝜙-
ing. First, because I cannot govern that which I have no causal influence over. 
And second, because my self-governance over my 𝜙-ing requires that I both 
chose to 𝜙 and direct (manage the steps of) my 𝜙-ing. If a friend is making 
coffee, then I cannot be self-governing with respect to making the coffee. The 
fact is that I am not the one making the coffee. At the same time, if my friend is 
a mad scientist who directs my body to make coffee, I am still not self-
governing with respect to making coffee. The fact is that I am not directing my 
action of making coffee. In this way, that I am directing my	𝜙-ing is necessary for 
my self-governance with respect to 𝜙-ing. Now, as far as I am aware, what I 
have said so far is more or less uncontroversial. Nevertheless, there is another, 
more controversial aspect of my directing 𝜙-ing that now needs addressing. 
 
Attitudinal Coherence and Proper Descriptions of Action 
In order to attribute an action 𝜙 to an agent, it is necessary that the agent’s 
𝜙-related attitudes are coherent with one another. Consider an example.  
 
I know that Tim intends to drink a beer, and I see him heading for 
the fridge (manifesting his intention to open the fridge). On that 
basis, I attribute the belief that there is beer in the fridge to Tim. I 
am assuming that Tim’s intentions, desires, and beliefs fit together 
coherently here. If I didn’t think that, I would have no reason to 
favor attributing the belief that there is beer in the fridge over the 
belief that the fridge is empty and that the only available beer is in 
the garage. The latter interpretation literally doesn’t make sense of 
Tim’s behavior, namely his heading for the fridge rather than the 
garage. An assumption of coherence is thus needed to attribute 
mental states to Tim[.] (Worsnip 2018a: 197-198) 
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As I read Worsnip, the assumption of relevant coherent attitude combinations is 
needed to attribute attitudes between agents and their actions. Just as with Tim, 
without attributing jointly coherent 𝜙-related attitudes to me, we cannot say 
that I am self-governing with respect to 𝜙-ing. For we cannot say that I am 𝜙-
ing at all. Now, what I have just said is not simply a point about interpretation. 
That we must assume I am attitudinally coherent in order to interpret me as 
acting is symptomatic of a deeper fact—that actions come with proper descriptions, 
and these descriptions have coherent content. 
 As discussed earlier (section 3.1c), we identity actions by their proper 
descriptions. In order to be playing chess, I need to do what is required of 
playing chess—i.e., trying to win, waiting my turn, moving chess pieces 
according to the rules of chess, etc. In order for this chess playing to be my 
action, my 𝜙-related attitudes need to correspond to a proper description of 
chess playing.131 
However, in order to do this, two things must be true. First, the relevant 
proper description of chess playing must be intelligible (I assume this is always 
true132). Second, my 𝜙-related attitudes must intelligibly correspond to the 
content of the proper description. For if my 𝜙-related attitudes are 
unintelligible, they will not correspond to the proper description of chess 
playing. Simply put, I cannot match something that makes no sense with 
something else that does make sense. I would not even be comparing apples 
with oranges; rather, I would be comparing “I-do-not-know-what” with 
oranges. Therefore, in order for my 𝜙-related attitudes to correspond to chess 
making, my 𝜙-related attitudes must at least be intelligible.  
 
Self-Governance, Action Intelligibility, and Attitudinal Coherence 
Now, recall from Chapter One that, whenever a combination of our 
attitudes is incoherent, those attitudes are jointly unintelligible (Section 1.1-1.2). 
 
131 Of course, proper descriptions can become more fine-grained. For instance, there will be as 
many proper descriptions of chess playing as there are versions of chess. Equally so, if we are 
teaching someone to play chess, “trying to win” may not be part of the proper description of 
“teaching chess.” The point is that proper descriptions need not become over-demanding as we 
can account for subtleties with more fine-grained proper descriptions. 
 
132 Without intelligible proper descriptions, there can be no identifiable actions.   
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We literally cannot make sense of the attitude combination as anything 
determinate. This unintelligibility is why, when we are “clear-eyed”133 about 
this attitude combination (about its incoherence), we are disposed to drop or 
change at least one of the attitudes involved (it is our way of making sense of 
ourselves). That said, in order to avoid my 𝜙-related attitudes from being 
unintelligible, I have to structure these attitudes in a jointly coherent way. 
That said, in order to self-govern with respect to my 𝜙-ing, I must 
structure my 𝜙-related attitudes in a coherent way. For, in order to direct my 
action 𝜙, I must do so in identifiable ways that constitute 𝜙-ing. Otherwise, I 
am either not 𝜙-ing or not directing my 𝜙-ing. Therefore, to govern my 𝜙-ing, I 
have to structure my 𝜙-related attitudes in a way that corresponds to a proper 
description of 𝜙-ing. And in order to facilitate this correspondence, I must 
structure my 𝜙-related attitudes intelligibly (which is just to say that I must 
structure these attitudes in a jointly coherent way). I cannot self-govern my 
action of “going to town” if either (1) I do not structure my attitudes to 
intelligibly correspond to a proper description of going to town or (2) I am not 
actually going to town. In order to self-govern my action, then, my action must 
be coherently directed, and I must be the one directing it. Therefore, my self-
governance over my actions requires that I structure my attitudes in coherent 
ways (that I comply with coherence requirements).134 In this way, I understand 
coherence requirements as constitutive norms of self-governance. 
 
3.3c: Three Questions for My Position 
 Given the above argument, I now want to expand on a few points. For, 
based on what I have said so far, it seems that my argument could entail an 
overdemanding account of self-governance and action. I do not think this is the 
 
133 Following Worsnip’s terminology, being “clear-eyed” about our attitudes amounts to being 
under conditions of full transparency, meaning that we hold a combination of mental states 
without the aid of “self-deception, mental fragmentation, or any failure of self-knowledge” 
pertaining to our attitudes (2018a: 188). See also Chapter One: section 1.1.  
 
134 This point may seem to entail an over-demanding position on action—that all imperfect 
action is impossible because action requires perfect attitudinal coherence. In the following 
section, I address this worry.  
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case. Defending this point, then, I now attend to three questions concerning my 
argument.   
 
1. Does My Position Rule Out Imperfect Action? 
From my argument so far, it would seem that I have made action 
incredibly hard to accomplish. For when I fail to structure my 𝜙-related 
attitudes coherently, it seems that I am not 𝜙-ing at all.135 If so, then it seems 
that, in order to self-govern over my actions, I need to structure my action-
related attitudes in perfectly coherent ways. That said, I plan to stave off this 
interpretation by expanding on my position to allow for imperfect action.  
As I see it, I need to offer two things. First, I need a way to account for 
agents 𝜙-ing when those agents are not perfectly 𝜙-ing. Second, I need a means 
to describe mistakes with respect to 𝜙-ing. I will address each issue in turn.  
Attending to the first issue, I can think we can say that, given an action 
𝜙, there will have to be some core subset of essential 𝜙-related attitudes 𝑋 such 
that, if we fail to structure 𝑋’s attitudes coherently, we fail to self-govern over 
𝜙. In terms of an action, we can refer to the broad strokes of 𝜙-ing that, if not 
carried out, entail that we fail to 𝜙. If my action is boarding a bus, there can be 
both essential and nonessential sub-actions associated with my bus-boarding. 
For example, intending to and actually boarding the bus are essential; dancing 
to Gloria Gaynor’s “I Will Survive” into the bus is not, but it might get the job 
done, nonetheless. The point is that there are essential and nonessential sub-
actions associated with any complex action.136  
Given this nested understanding of actions, we can now allow that the 
intelligibility of our actions runs along a spectrum, that meeting some minimal 
threshold of essential attitudinal coherence is what is necessary. Said 
differently, if I am 𝜙-ing (or trying to 𝜙), it must be the case that some 
minimally sufficient subset of my essential 𝜙-related attitudes jointly cohere in 
 
135 In order to discuss this issue more straightforwardly, I will here focus exclusively on self-
governed action. For if I am forced by some external force to perform some action, we 
commonly do not attribute this performance (nor the criticism/praise associated with it) to me.  
 
136 However small a set of attitudes we choose to associate with basic actions, my account will 
have to claim that attitudinal coherence with respect to these actions will be all or nothing—we 
either perform these basic actions or we do not.  
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order to correspond minimally to the proper description of 𝜙-ing. Now, where 
this threshold exactly lies is perhaps hard to specify and may even differ across 
different adaptations of this view. Nevertheless, needing our attitudes to 
correspond intelligibly to a proper description of our action does not seem, in 
and of itself, a hard sell. For we need to be at least intelligibly doing something 
in order to be governing over that something (there has to be an intelligible 
object for our self-governance). That said, even without perfectly specifying this 
threshold, I think that positing its existence is reasonable. Moving to the second 
issue. 
With what I have said so far, I think accounting for action-related 
mistakes is more or less straightforward: I make a mistake with respect to 𝜙-ing 
when a subset 𝑍 of my 𝜙-related attitudes is incoherent with respect to the 
essential subset 𝑋 of 𝜙-related attitudes. Now, I can think of two kinds of 
cases.137 The first kind is when 𝑍, being internally coherent, corresponds to a 
sub-action in conflict with my 𝜙-ing. When playing chess, I move my bishop in 
an “L”-shaped way, accidentally violating the rules of chess.138 The other kind 
of case I can think of is when 𝑍 is not internally coherent. Say that we are 
playing speed chess and, intending to move my pawn, I get distracted139 and 
fail to take the necessary means (moving the pawn before the timer expires). 
The main point is that, if we have nonessential 𝜙-related attitudes, these 
attitudes could potentially interfere with how well our essential 𝜙-related 
attitudes function while we 𝜙.140 
 
137 There can, of course, be other factors leading to imperfect action performance. For example, 
if, when playing chess, a gust of wind sweeps away the board and pieces, we have imperfectly 
played chess in the sense that we failed to complete the game. While this failure was not due to 
a mistake on our parts, we nevertheless failed to succeed at playing the whole game of chess. 
More importantly, however, such cases would not distract from the intelligibility that we were 
playing chess. So, these kinds of imperfections I leave aside.  
 
138 Perhaps I get distracted and mix up the rules in my head, or that I thought my bishop was a 
knight, etc. The point is that there are ways of describing an intentional action as a mistake. I do 
not think, however, that this mistake is intentional, which I will discuss soon.  
 
139 Either by some desire I have or by some other external factor. 
 
140 Here I would like to note that the above description of imperfect action plays well with 
Worsnip’s (2018a) definitional account of incoherence. If we are genuinely trying to play chess, 
but our overall chess playing involves some attitudinal incoherence, it makes sense that, when 
this incoherence is pointed out, we will be disposed to change our attitudes in some way that 
removes the incoherence. Recall Chapter One: Section 1.1 for my discussion of Worsnip’s 
 78 
Lastly, what about intentional mistakes? At this point, I am comfortable 
claiming that there are no intentional mistakes. That said, I can think of two 
ways this question could be raised. The first version asks whether, under my 
view, intentional deviance from a proper description can be an action. The 
second version asks whether intentional attitudinal incoherence is possible 
under my view. I will address each version in turn.  
First, if minimally coherent, my action, insofar as it intentionally deviates 
from the proper description of 𝜙-ing, should signify that either I am not really 
trying to 𝜙 or I am trying to do multiple things at once and managing poorly. 
With the former, think of a magician appearing to saw a person in half, when in 
fact this is an illusion.141 With the latter, think of my playing chess really badly 
because I am also talking on the phone, etc. In either case, the intentional 
deviance can be captured by referencing alternative proper descriptions.142  
Second, intentional attitudinal incoherence has no place in my account 
simply because, by definition, this incoherence could not intelligibly 
correspond to any proper description of an action.143 For, in order to do so, we 
would have to claim that the proper description of the action is itself both 
unintelligible and unintelligible in a way that distinguishes it from other proper 
unintelligible descriptions of actions. At this point, I think we lose the very 
meaning of description. For we lose the descriptive standards of actions that 
 
account of attitudinal incoherence. Also see Worsnip (2018a: 188-190, 194-198) for the original 
content regarding this point.  
 
141 Alternatively, if I intend to move chess pieces around purposefully in illegal ways, then I am 
not playing chess. I am learning chess or teaching chess (in terms of what not to do) or some 
other action. 
 
142 Another option is that various actions are taking place that, when the corresponding 
attitudes are mistakenly interpreted together, appear very close to a proper description of a 
different (more complex) action. Either way, the same point follows.  
 
143 In cases with eccentric billionaires offering us money to be incoherent, the intentional action 
can still correspond to a set of jointly coherent attitudes. For, in these scenarios, we usually 
press a button, take a potion, etc. to allow for the incoherence. That said, the action (and 
corresponding jointly coherent attitudes) can refer to pressing the button, drinking the potion, 
etc. We need not say that the effect (the attitudinal incoherence itself) is what we intentionally 
do. See Kavka (1983) for the original toxin puzzle example and Gillessen (2018) for a discussion 
on high-order attitudinal coherence wherein normative coherence requirements account for 
induced attitudinal incoherence as a means to an end. See also Chapter Two: Section 2.3 (end of 
section footnote) for why having reasons to proceed in the above cases do not threaten the 
normativity of coherence requirements. 
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coherence allows for. Because of this issue, I disregard intentional attitudinal 
incoherence as an action.  
 
2. Does Our Inability to Hold Intentionally Incoherent Sets of Attitudes Invalidate the 
Normativity of Coherence Requirements? 
We should not think that my denial of intentional attitudinal incoherence 
removes our ability to fail with respect to coherence requirements, only that we 
cannot intentionally fail. As discussed above, we can clearly make mistakes 
wherein some combination of our attitudes is jointly incoherent. In these cases, 
while we do not intentionally violate coherence requirements, we can still fail to 
meet their standards as I have shown above. We can fail to succeed with respect 
to standards of some action—either in terms of incoherent attitude 
combinations or in terms of coherent attitude combinations that are incoherent 
with one another. In either case, when we fail at some level with respect to an 
action, we fail to meet the standards of coherence requirements at that same 
level. In turn, we fail to self-govern with respect to the action at that level. So, 
we can be more or less coherent across our attitudes as we are more or less self-
governing at any point in time. I think this kind of failure is enough.144 
Furthermore, this limitation of my view does not impede us from 
immoral cases or possibly even cases of self-deception (if considered an 
intentional act). With respect to particular actions, we can cohere our attitudes 
toward selfish acts or hurting others, etc. Similarly, if self-deception is an 
intentional act, then it seems reasonable that, with respect to that action, we can 
coherently cherry pick evidence that supports our false beliefs. Furthermore, we 
need not be structurally irrational in order to be substantively irrational. For we 
can certainly be attitudinally coherent with respect to ends we choose for the 
wrong reasons (financial reward, self-conceit, unjustified desire satisfaction, 
etc.). All these kinds of cases run on my view.  
 
3. Does Self-Governance Require the Absence of all Attitudinal Incoherence? 
Given the above description of imperfect action, I can now address a 
larger potential misreading of my view. For I am not saying that, in order to be 
 
144 For a more in-depth constitutivist defense of this position, see Fix (2020).  
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self-governing, we have to be globally self-governing—that we have to be 
perfectly coherent across all our attitudes. Certainly not. Here, I think sudoku 
works as a useful metaphor. When playing sudoku, we can have isolated 
pockets of numbers that jointly cohere within those pockets respectively. 
Nevertheless, while these pockets should cohere with one another across the 
board, this global coherence need not be the case to play the game (only to win 
it). What I am getting at is that, while we are probably almost never globally 
coherent (across all our attitudes), we can certainly have coherent combinations 
here and there. To continue the metaphor, we are all most likely unfinished 




I have argued that compliance with coherence requirements is a 
necessary condition of self-governance. By structuring combinations of our 
attitudes in coherent ways, we are able to make sense of our actions as our 
own.145 In turn, these (coherently structured) actions are the objects of our self-
governance. If this argument is correct, then I have successfully reached 
Bratman’s conclusion. That said, I think it is prudent now to say a bit about 






145 David Velleman (2000, 2009) argues similarly, pointing out that actions performed without 
our awareness can hardly be intentional actions. For Velleman, our actions must be intelligible 
to us. While Velleman relates this intelligibility of action to a constitutive aim of action based in 
a sub-agential desire for self-knowledge (2000: 21-26, 139), I make no such particular 
commitments. For example, Kantians may make similar arguments while relying on pure 
reason-based motivational models rather than Velleman’s desire-based schema (See Uleman 
[2016] for a conative approach to practical reason). Rather than rely on sub-agential desires or 
claims of constitutive aims of action, I argue that coherence requirements offer a conceptually 
light approach to the intelligibility of action. For, rather than pinpoint a special “governing” 
attitude, coherence requirements structure attitude combinations in ways that instantiate 
intentionality. Furthermore, my approach allows us to remain neutral on the cognitivist/non-
cognitivist debate over intentional action (whether knowledge is or is not involved 
respectively). For cognitivists like Velleman, the intelligibility requirement I argue for can be 
incorporated into claims about self-knowledge over our actions. For non-cognitivists like 
Bratman, intelligibility can be a structural condition on agents identifying with their actions.  
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3.3d: A Counterfactual Thesis for Coherence Requirements 
 Like Bratman, I have argued that complying with coherence 
requirements is necessary for being self-governing. Now, while I am not 
arguing that our self-governance gives us a prior reason to comply with 
coherence requirements, I am saying that coherence requirements are 
constitutive norms of self-governance. That said, when (in section 3.4) I argue 
for the normativity of self-governance, I will be making the claim that this 
normativity is the normativity of coherence requirements. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that Kiesewetter’s criticism against Bratman can still 
reach my argument. That said, I will now reexamine Kiesewetter’s criticism 
with respect to my account.  
As we have seen (in section 3.3b) there are numerous cases where we 
abstain on issues while remaining self-governing with respect to those issues 
(our self-governing decision to abstain on 𝑋, etc.). These cases put a dent in 
Kiesewetter’s criticism since he can no longer claim that my account entails that 
we have a reason to determine where we stand on these issues. Nevertheless, a 
large portion of Kiesewetter’s challenge remains. For I still need to deal with all 
the possible cases where our self-governance does require us to determine 
where we stand on issues (driving towards a fork in the road, determining 
whether we will attend an event, moving a bishop, etc.). That said, I now move 
to meet this challenge. 
 
Self-Governance—One Action at a Time 
I think self-governance (if normative) justifies the normativity of 
coherence requirements one agent and one context at a time. It is the case that 
there are countless issues where, in order to be self-governing with respect to 
them, we must determine where we stand. Nevertheless, I do not think that we 
need to be self-governing with respect to all these issues at the same time. There is 
no need to validate the normativity of coherence requirements for all contexts 
up front as long as these requirements are validated in all contexts in which we 




Counterfactual Coherence-Based Reasons: For any possible (mental or 
physical) action 𝜙, were an agent to engage with 𝜙, then that agent would 
have a coherence-based reason 𝑅 to structure 𝜙-related attitudes in 
coherent ways.146 
 
In other words, (if self-governance is normative, then) coherence requirements 
will constitute reasons to structure different attitudes coherently for different 
agents. Depending on what we are doing or trying to do, coherence 
requirements will constitute reasons to structure those attitudes we have. 
Collectively, across all possible agents in all possible contexts, I think this claim 
measures up against the idea that we always have coherence-based reasons to 
structure our attitudes coherently. As long as we conceive of wide-scope 
coherence requirements to “kick in” with respect to what we do or think about, 
we avoid Kiesewetter’s claim that we have reasons to determine where we 
stand on all possible issues. We would only have reasons to determine where 
we stand on those issues that (1) we engage with and (2) we do not abstain on. 
This claim, I think, is neither unintuitive nor overdemanding. 
 
A Challenge for My Account and a Domain Restriction for Structural Rationality 
Given my position above, one more Kiesewetter-esque challenge 
remains. Consider the following example.  
 
Absent Marshmallow Tower: If I never have and never will aim to build a 
4-foot-tall tower out of marshmallows, how do we explain my reason to 
comply with the instrumental requirement: [not intend to build the 
marshmallow tower, or not believe that buying marshmallows is 
necessary for building the tower, or intend to buy marshmallows]? I 
guess I do comply with it, since I do not intend to build the tower. But 
what reason do I have to comply with it? There is no self-governance 
involved here. 
 
146 Now, by “engage” I mean that the agent either intends to 𝜙, performs 𝜙, thinks about 
(considers) 𝜙-ing, etc. I am also assuming here that the agent’s potential 𝜙-related attitudes are 




This worry seems to stem from the fact that the coherence requirements I aim to 
defend are wide-scope and so, if normative, unconditionally apply for all 
possible actions. So, what about those actions (or issues) I never have and never 
will engage with? 
I think the proper response here is to restrict the domain of wide-scope 
coherence requirements to accommodate Counterfactual Coherence-Based Reasons 
above. Since it is not possible for me to self-govern with respect to an action (or 
issue) I will never engage with, my view disallows the constitution of reasons to 
structure attitudes relating to these actions and issues for me coherently. 
However, were I to engage with building a 4-foot-tall marshmallow tower, then I 
would have the relevant coherence-based reason.  
Understood in this way, the “unconditionality” of wide-scope coherence 
requirements amounts to the claim that, in all cases where agents hold or 
entertain rationally governable attitudes, coherence requirements constitute 
reasons for those agents to structure those attitudes in coherent ways. Under my 
account, then, wide-scope coherence requirements are “unconditional” in the 
sense that they apply regardless of which rationally governable attitudes an agent 
has. Nevertheless, the coherence requirement instruction is still “conditional” in 
the sense that it relies on the existence of agents with rationally governable 
attitudes in the first place. Okay, so what is my justification for the above 
position on wide-scope coherence requirements? My answer is twofold. 
First, I think that cases unaccounted for by Counterfactual Coherence-Based 
Reasons violate the preconditions for normative coherence requirements. 
Consider Absent Marshmallow Tower. In order for coherence requirements to 
have authority over how I ought to structure my 𝜙-related attitudes, I must be 
able to succeed or fail at structuring my 𝜙-related attitudes in the way 
coherence requirements prescribe. In the case of marshmallow-tower building, 
my success amounts to avoiding an incoherent combination of marshmallow-
tower attitudes; my failure amounts to having an incoherent combination. 
However, since “I never have and never will” have any marshmallow attitudes, 
I cannot fail with respect to the instrumental requirement (or any other 
coherence requirement) in this case. For I simply never hold an incoherent 
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combination of marshmallow attitudes.147 Because of this fact, Absent 
Marshmallow Tower violates the preconditions of normative coherence 
requirements.  
 Furthermore, any case that is similar in form to Absent Marshmallow 
Tower will be ruled out for the same reason. If the conditions of an example are 
that I have and never will have a particular set of attitudes, then I will be unable 
to fail with respect to coherence requirements about these attitudes. For as long 
as I can never have these attitudes, I can never have an incoherent combination 
of them. Of course, if there is a substantive reason to aim to build a 4-foot-tall 
tower out of marshmallows, then I can be substantively irrational if, other 
things being equal, I do not respond to this reason. But this is a different issue. 
Structural rationality is not about what attitudes or ends we ought to adopt or 
drop; it is about how we ought to structure the attitudes we have. There is no 
structuring if there are no attitudes to structure.  
Second, even if cases like Absent Marshmallow Tower somehow avoid 
violating the preconditions of normative requirements, we will never need a 
reason to structure attitudes we will never have. Under my account, the reasons 
constituted by coherence requirements (to structure attitudes coherently) “kick 
in” with respect to the actions and issues agents engage with. Because of this 
fact, our reasons to structure our attitudes will always be available for us for 
any possible action or issue with which we engage.148 If no possible agent ever 
considers building a 4-foot marshmallow tower, we do not need a reason to 
structure these absent attitudes. If some agent does consider this endeavor (or 
another involving the tower), then that agent will have the relevant coherence-
based reason. That said, there exists no possible (rationally governable) context 
where an agent has attitudes {	𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, …} and there is no reason for that agent to 
structure {	𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, …} in a coherent way. This conclusion, I think, is enough.  
 
147 I am, of course, assuming that I do not acquire these attitudes in any other way (by a mad 
scientist or because I am dealing with a similar issue and these attitudes tangentially arise, etc.). 
However, in cases where I do have these attitudes, their modifiability is either outside of my 
control wherein I am not responsible for them (Chapter Two: Section 2.2e) or within my control, 
and I do have a reason to structure them coherently. In either case, however, the presence of 
these attitudes takes us outside the example currently discussed. 
 
148 Since (in Section 3.1b) I include deliberations as mental actions alongside physical actions, 
any possible agent will have a reason to structure their attitudes coherently for all rationally 
governable attitudes they will ever have.  
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Moving Forward 
 I believe that the above discussion suffices to show that we can 
constitutively connect attitudinal coherence with self-governance in way that 
avoids the pitfalls of Bratman’s argument. In doing so, I claim that coherence 
requirements are constitutive norms of self-governance. For, the intelligibility of 
what we are doing when we self-govern our actions necessarily depends on our 
action-related attitudinal coherence. Therefore, our capacity to structure our 
attitudes in coherent ways is part and parcel of our capacity to self-govern. 
With that said, it is finally time to argue for the normativity of coherence 
requirements by arguing for the normativity of self-governance.  
 
3.4: The Non-Derivative Normativity of Self-Governance 
 In this section I aim to show that our self-governance functions as a non-
derivatively normative structure. In order to do this, (section 3.4a) I argue that 
self-governance functions naturally under the non-derivative reason-relation. 
Next, (in section 3.4b) I show that, under the non-derivative reason-relation, 
self-governance meets Rosati’s condition of normative explicability. That is, I 
argue that the normativity of self-governance is self-justifying. If successful, 
then the normativity of our self-governance will vindicate the normativity of 
coherence requirements. 
 
3.4a: Self-Governance under the Non-Derivative Reason Relation 
Recall (from section 3.3a) that a set of requirements 𝑆 is non-derivatively 
normative if facts about what 𝑆 requires of agents constitute reasons for agents 
to have an appropriately related response 𝜃. Now, let us plug in self-
governance for 𝑆 and see if the relation makes sense. 
 
Non-Derivative Reason-Relation (for Self-Governance): Any fact 
about what self-governance requires of some agent 𝐴 constitutes a 
reason 𝑅 for 𝐴 to have an appropriately related response 𝜃.  
 
Does self-governance make sense under the non-derivative reason-relation? I 
think it does. First, our self-governance constitutively requires of us that we are 
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able to respond to considerations and facts as potential reasons. This means 
that, when I am self-governing with respect to some action 𝜙, the facts about 
what self-governance requires of me (having the ability to respond to 𝜙-related 
reasons in this case) constitute149 reasons for me to 𝜙. This point is more or less 
definitional since the principle of “ought implies can” itself is built into the very 
concept of self-governance.150 Second (and this point is really more of an 
extension of the first point), my appropriately related response 𝜃 will just be my 
(mental or physical) 𝜙-ing. Since the function of self-governance transparently 
manifests as our particular actions, 𝜃 will always be my 𝜙-ing based on the 
reasons to 𝜙. As such, I think self-governance easily fits within the non-
derivative reason-relation.  
 
3.4b: The Explicability of Non-Derivatively Normative Self-Governance 
 Now, let us return to Rosati’s point about normative explicability. 
Following Rosati, “an account of normative properties captures their 
normativity when it makes the ordinary inferential relations among our 
normative judgments (our judgments about these properties) explicable” (2016: 
209). Now, in cases of derivative normativity, this explicability is 
straightforward. We ought to follow requirement 𝑆 because of some reason 𝑅.151 
However, as we have already seen (in sections 3.2a-3.2d), when it comes to non-
derivatively normative structures, dealing with this question is no longer easy 
or straightforward. Therefore, in order to vindicate the normativity of our self-
governance, I need to show how self-governance allows us to respond properly 
to the question: Why be self-governing? Furthermore, I need to respond to this 
 
149 Here, I am using “constitute” in a liberal sense. What I mean by “constitute” is that my 
capacity for self-governance constitutes 𝜙-related reasons as my 𝜙-related reasons. The idea 
here is similar to mental representations “taking in” what is external and constituting it 
internally. This point conforms with an externalist view on reasons. However, from an 
internalist perspective on reasons, we could alternatively take “constitutes” more literally, that, 
based on external facts, our self-governance constitutes reasons internally “from the ground 
up,” where otherwise these reasons would not exist. The point is to stay neutral here on the 
reasons-externalism/internalism debate. For I do not think that a victory for either side in this 
debate will seriously affect my argument here. 
 
150 What I mean is that we typically understand our capacity for self-governance in terms of our 
ability (the “can” part) to respond to reasons (the “ought” part).  
 
151 Of course, following Worsnip (2020), this strategy is successful only if whatever 𝑅 transmits 
from eventually bottoms out in some non-derivatively normative structure. 
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question in a way that is both informative and final—in a way that justifiably 
terminates the regress of further “Why?” questions.  
 As it turns out, I think Worsnip hits on this point when he references 
Christine Korsgaard’s (1996) work. Worsnip writes, “following Korsgaard, let’s 
call anything that brings the regress to an end—whatever is non-derivatively 
normatively significant—a ‘source of normativity’” (2020: 6).152 Korsgaard’s 
insight here is that the only satisfactory answer that “will bring the reiteration 
of 'but why must I do that?' to an end […] [is] one that makes it impossible, 
unnecessary, or incoherent to ask why again” (1996: 33). As I have said, 
Worsnip is correct that the regress of reasons and requirements does have to 
stop somewhere. My point is that I think Worsnip stops in the wrong place. 
For, as I have said previously (in sections 3.2c-3.2d), the problem for 
Worsnip’s account is that it does not seem “impossible, unnecessary, or 
incoherent” to ask: Why structure our attitudes coherently? First, this question 
does not seem incoherent or impossible to answer. If we treat substantive and 
structural rationality distinctly (which Worsnip and I do), we can coherently 
ask if there is a substantive reason to follow structural forms of rationality. 
Second, the above question seems very necessary. For, as Rosati’s aptly points 
out, in order to capture a requirement’s normativity, we need to be able to 
explain why that requirement is normative (2016: 209).  
That said, I think the only available place to stop the regress is with self-
governance. Of course, stopping the regress with self-governance is stopping 
the regress with coherence requirements—since I have already argued that the 
latter are constitutive norms of the former. However, as we will see, my 
repackaging of Worsnip’s coherence requirements into self-governance allows 
for a more robust defense in terms of self-governance. This is where we need to 
make our stand. Why? Because only with self-governance can we both reject 
further “Why?” questions and respond to the question “Why be self-
governing?” in an informative way.153 How is this possible? The answer lies in 
the relation between self-governance and agency. 
 
152 Here, Worsnip is referring to Korsgaard’s 1996 monograph, The Sources of Normativity. 
 
153 Bottoming out the normativity of coherence requirements in other structures risks conceiving 
of attitudinal coherence as valuable for achieving other ends (effective desire-satisfaction, etc.). 
Doing so risks making coherence-based reasons wrong kind reasons (see Section 2.3). 
Furthermore, approaches like Korsgaard’s (1996) project rely on recognizing the “value” of self-
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Self-Governance as the Proper Description of Agency 
 The key to understanding the normative force of self-governance is 
realizing that this rationally self-guiding state is the proper description of agency. 
Recall (in section 3.1c) that a proper description is a constitutive standard that is 
normative for the exercise of what that description describes. Thus, 
understanding agents as potential self-governors opens the door for 
understanding self-governance as the proper description of agency. With this 
proper description in place, we can now both identify agents as agents and make 
judgments about how well we are functioning as agents.  
 In this way, self-governance is constitutively normative for how to 
function as an agent. Unlike proper descriptions of actions, however, I think that 
self-governance is an unconditionally normative activity. Why? Because insofar as 
we operate in the domain of reasons—insofar as normative requirements apply 
to us—we are functioning according to the constitutive standard given by the proper 
description of agency (i.e., self-governance). Our capacity to respond to reasons, 
to structure and guide our actions rationally, is part and parcel of being an 
agent.  
 
Two Perspectival Forms of the Same Question 
Returning now to the “Why?” question, how can I both reject further 
“Why?” questions and informatively respond to the question Why be self-
governing? Because, when asked about self-governance, the “Why?” question 
implies two possible vantage points: externally by “something” considering 
whether to be an agent (and adopt the norms of self-governance), and internally 
by an agent (already functioning under those norms). That said, I reject the 
external version and will show why the internal version is self-validating.  
The external version of the “Why be self-governing?” question is literally 
unintelligible. This is so because, outside of our capacity for self-governance, 
there are no standards determining (1) what is being asked and (2) what merits 
an acceptable answer. You cannot coherently ask a question outside the space 
 
governance (agency in Korsgaard’s terms). I think these kinds of positions argue for self-
governance “too far down the road” so-to-speak. For the introspective regress that Korsgaard 
relies on is itself an act of self-governance. That said, we must already be committed to the 
norms of self-governance to determine its value for us. That said, I think we can argue more 
directly by looking at the structure of self-governance itself. 
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of reasons. Since, no matter what account of reasons is on the table, reasons to 
be self-governing will have to be considered within the agential domain of self-
governance.154 In this way, I reject the external version of the “Why?” question 
along with any further external “Why?” questions. I have ended the regress 
from this perspective. 
However, I have done so in an informative way. I have rejected further 
“Why?” questions based on the fact that there is no intelligible prior vantage 
point from which we can take up these further questions. So, while I do not offer 
an external prior reason for being self-governing, I do informatively say why the 
regress ought to stop here (rather than alternatives like desire-satisfaction, brute 
rational normativity, universal values, etc.).155 
The internal version of the “Why be self-governing?” question, 
alternatively, is self-validating. Taking a page from Matthew Silverstein, the 
“normative authority of practical reasons is not predicated on your having 
good reasons to remain an agent. Rather, it is predicated on the fact that you are 
already an agent” (2014: 1135).156 The point here is that, insofar as we are able to 
consider the “Why?” question, we are already “playing by the self-governing 
rules of agency” so-to-speak. In this way, any consideration of the “Why be self-
governing?” question relies on our compliance with the very norms about 
which this question asks.157 In this way, we cannot choose not to validate the 
norms of our self-governance.158 Thus, as self-governing agents, when we are 
 
154 Remember that, on my account, our deliberation of an issue is itself an act of self-governance. 
That said, we must entertain this question from within a self-governing perspective.  
 
155 I find Worsnip to be making a similar point, only about coherence requirements themselves: 
“there are some particular questions of the form ‘why be 𝑋?’ that are inherently nonsensical or 
confused” (2020: 5). As I have said before, however, the problem is that I think the 
unintelligibility of such questions does not occur until you try to escape the entire space of 
reasons—until you try to escape agency itself. 
 
156 Here Silverstein (2014) is responding to Enoch’s (2006, 2011) Shmagency challenge that asks 
constitutivists, Why be an agent? 
 
157 Of course, various reasons for suspending agency exist, including taking a nap or avoiding 
pain (rendering oneself unconscious) (Silverstein 2014: 1134). Equally, given overwhelming 
situations, we may decide to take breaks from thinking and decision making to optimize our 
performance overall. Regardless of particulars, the normative force of reasons arrived at within 
self-governing agency derives from the proper description of agency (the activity of self-
governance).  
 
158 Once again, since normative error is understood as something that happens to us or about us 
(as a defect of our action) rather than something we intentionally do (as a perfection of our 
action), the inability to choose against this validation is not a problem for my position (see 
section 3.3c).  
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faced with the internal “Why be self-governing?” question, we should not reject 
it. Rather, it is prudent for us to answer: “Because being self-governing allows 
us to lead our lives.” 
 
Non-Derivative Normative Explicability 
I think this answer should be sufficient for Rosati’s requirement of 
normative explicability. First, because this approach allows an informative 
response for why self-governance is an appropriate normative structure for 
ending the regress of “Why?” questions. Second, because this response (to the 
internal version of the “Why?” question) allows us to illustrate the necessary 
normativity of self-governance without relying on a reason to for this normative 
authority. Third, I think this response captures a key aspect of normativity that 
Rosati was driving at: that “[n]ormative judgments can carry recommending 
force only to [...] beings capable of self-governance” (2016: 207), and this is why 
“a property can have a normative character only if it ‘essentially or analytically 
involves reference to an agent’” (2016: 209).159 To reiterate, my answer is neither 
a rejection of the (internal) question asked, nor a further external reason to be 
self-governing. It is an expression of the constitutively normative framework 
under which we are already functioning. Now, this answer maybe seem 
circular, and in fact to a degree it is. Nevertheless, I think this answer is not 
viciously circular—for its circularity offers a clear explanation of our 
commitment to self-governance. First, because self-governance is a necessary 
condition for all normative discussions. And second, because our commitment 
to self-governance is simply what is functionally constitutive of the kind of 





159 This point solves a further issue raised by Schroeder (2004) against wide-scope formulations 
of coherence requirements. As Schroeder writes, wide-scope accounts posit “a basic, eternal, 
agent-neutral requirement rationally binding on every agent, no matter what they are like. As 
with all of the others, it offers no explanation of this requirement. Narrow-Scope accounts can 
explain the obligations or reasons that they postulate. After all, these obligations or reasons only 
exist given a certain condition—so we can use that condition to explain them. But not so for the 
Wide-Scopers” (2004: 349, italics added). With my account, we can now explain the obligations 
of wide-scope coherence requirements: Meeting these obligations is part and parcel of properly 
functioning as an agent (being self-governing).  
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3.5: Chapter Conclusion—Structural Rationality for Self-Governance 
As I have argued, coherence requirements are constitutive norms of our 
self-governance. For the intelligibility of our governed actions depend on the 
coherence of our action-corresponding attitudes. Furthermore, I have claimed 
that self-governance is just what it means to be a properly functioning agent—
to correspond to the proper description (the constitutive standard) of agency. 
Defending this claim, I have argued that self-governance holds under 
Worsnip’s non-derivative reason-relation for normative requirements. 
Furthermore, I have argued that self-governance (unlike coherence 
requirements) allows us to meet full normative explicability—to explain why 
this requirement is non-derivatively normative for the kind of creatures that we 
are. Taking self-governance as the normative standard for agency, insofar as we 
remain agents, we commit ourselves to this standard—we continue to “play the 
game of agency,” which requires our adherence to its norms. And as I have 
argued, coherence requirements are among these norms. Therefore, our 
commitment to the normativity of self-governance is our commitment to the 
normativity of coherence requirements.  
In this way, I claim to vindicate Worsnip’s account of coherence 
requirements against Kolodny’s (2005) “Why be rational?” challenge. Kolodny 
asks us for a substantive, and unconditional, reason to follow coherence 
requirements (2005: 542-543). While I have not offered a substantive reason, I 
have shown that we are unconditionally committed to following coherence 
requirements. Furthermore, under this agent-constitutivist framework, we can 
now see the unintelligibility of Kolodny’s “Why?” question as it takes the form: 
“Why be an agent?”160 For, in all possible contexts we engage ourselves in as 
agents, we in turn exercise our self-governance, committing to coherence 





160 In this form, Kolodny’s question becomes the same as Enoch’s question: “Why be an agent, 
rather than a shmagent? (2006, 2011). Aimed uniquely at the issue of coherence requirement 
normativity, my argument against Kolodny is an application of Silverstein’s (2014) response 
against Enoch.  
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Dissertation Conclusion 
So, where have we come to? I have aimed to show that wide-scope 
coherence requirements are genuinely normative requirements of structural 
rationality. Working from Worsnip’s framework, I believe a strong case has 
been made. More specifically, I have worked to amend Worsnip’s (2020) 
position on normative wide-scope coherence requirements in several ways. 
Beginning in Chapter One, I laid out six coherence requirements under 
Worsnip’s dispositional framework. In order to provide a better unification of 
Worsnip’s dispositional account of incoherence, I aimed to provide a stricter 
(more attitudinally incoherent) conception of practical akrasia. In Chapter Two, 
I explored Worsnip’s position further and argued against various challenge in 
order to sustain the idea that normative coherence requirements do not entail 
controversial conclusions.  
Reaching Chapter Three, I worked to repackage Worsnip’s coherence 
requirements under a constitutivist framework about agency. Pulling 
inspiration from Bratman’s work, I reconceived coherence requirements as 
constitutive norms of self-governance. That said, I believe now that Worsnip’s 
position can effectively meet Kolodny’s “Why Be Rational?” challenge. For all 
agents, insofar as they agents, are always already committed to the norms of 
self-governance. This constitutivist fact allows us to ground coherence 
requirements in a definitive way while also illustrating why these requirements 
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